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Abstract 
 
We ask which migration policy a developed country will choose when its objective is to attain 
the optimal skill composition of the country’s workforce, and when the policy menu consists 
of an entry fee and a quota. We compare these two policies under the assumptions that 
individuals are heterogeneous in their skill level as well as in their skill type, and that 
individuals of one skill type, say “scientists,” confer a positive externality on overall 
productivity whereas individuals of the other skill type, say “managers,” do not confer such 
an externality. We find that a uniform entry fee encourages self-selection such that the 
migrants are only or mostly highly skilled managers. The (near) absence of migrant scientists 
has a negative effect on the productivity of the country’s workforce. Under a quota: the 
migrants are (a) only averagely skilled managers if the productivity externality generated by 
the scientists is weak, or (b) only averagely skilled scientists if the productivity externality 
generated by the scientists is strong. In (a), a uniform entry fee is preferable to a quota. In (b), 
a quota is preferable to a uniform entry fee. If, however, the entry fee for scientists is 
sufficiently below the entry fee for managers, then migrants will be only or mostly highly 
skilled scientists, rendering a differentiated entry fee preferable to a quota even when the 
productivity externality is strong. Instituting a differentiated fee comes, though, at a cost: the 
fee revenue is not as high as it will be when migrants are only or mostly managers. We 
conclude that if maximizing the revenue from the entry fee is not the primary objective of the 
developed country, then a differentiated entry fee is the preferred policy. 
 
Keywords: International migration; A quota; A uniform entry fee; A differentiated entry fee; 
Heterogeneous human capital; Optimal skill composition of the developed 
country’s workforce; Total factor productivity  
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1. Introduction 
Countries that receive migrants regularly evaluate their policies, and assess and weigh the 
advantages and disadvantages of alternative rules and admission procedures. Take the case of 
the US. Ever since The Immigration Restriction Act of 1921, the US has controlled the inflow 
of migrants by means of quotas, selecting migrants by their characteristics. At the outset, 
quotas were based on nationality, yet with the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1965, the focus shifted to migrants’ skills and family ties to US citizens. Several other 
migrant-receiving countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have had in place 
skill-based admission procedures.1 
If a receiving country seeks to admit skilled workers, and if it does that by means of a 
skill-selective quota, economics-based reasoning would suggest a seemingly simpler tool: 
selling the right to enter. The idea proposed by Freeman (2006) and Becker (2011), among 
others, is as follows. If the private returns from migration, as measured by a prospective 
migrant’s earnings, increase with the migrant’s skill level, then it would be more beneficial 
for high-skilled individuals to migrate than for low-skilled individuals. Consequently, the 
imposition of a high enough entry fee will discourage low-skilled individuals for whom the 
cost of entry will be higher than the gain from increased earnings. If the number of migrants 
decreases with the level of the entry fee, fine-tuning the fee will also control the number of 
migrants.  
This seemingly attractive policy may not be as appealing as it might appear at first sight. 
It stands to reason that individuals differ not only in their skill level, but also in their skill type 
(Willis, 1986; Grogger and Eide, 1995; Iyigun and Owen, 1998, 1999; Krueger and Lindahl, 
2001; Stark and Zakharenko, 2012), that different skill types generate different social returns, 
and that the skill types that generate high social returns (high production externalities) are not 
at the upper end of the pay distribution. Recent studies attest to this. For example, Peri et al. 
(2014, 2015) present evidence of the significant impact of STEM workers (Scientists, 
Technology professionals, Engineers, and Mathematicians) on total factor productivity in US 
cities. However, in 2015 the annual mean wage of a mathematician was 80 percent of the 
annual mean wage of a marketing manager, and 60 percent of the annual mean wage of a 
chief executive (BLS, 2015). In such a constellation, levying an entry fee may discourage 
migration by individuals with relatively low private returns but high social returns, who 
                                               
1 Kerr et al. (2016) discuss how the US, Canada, and Australia have used skill-based admission procedures. 
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would migrate under a selective quota based on skill type. The absence of such individuals 
among the migrants can have a negative effect on the overall productivity in the receiving 
country.  
A more attractive admission policy could be based on a differentiated entry fee: 
individuals in an occupation that generates high production externalities but pays a relatively 
low wage such as science, will be charged a fee that is far enough below the fee charged to 
individuals in an occupation that generates little production externalities but pays a relatively 
high wage such as management. A careful calibration of the fees will benefit the receiving 
country by attracting workers of the desirable skill type.  
There are few analyses of the implications of introducing an entry fee. Collie (2009) 
considers entry fee revenue as a means of compensating the native inhabitants for the lower 
terms of trade caused by the expansion of export industries following the arrival of migrants. 
Chao et al. (2013) suggest that entry fee revenue could be used to compensate the native 
inhabitants for the congestion in public services caused by migrants. Bianchi (2013) studies a 
setting in which migrants are heterogeneous in skill level, refers to fees or bureaucratic 
requirements that can be levied and imposed on the migrants by the receiving country, and 
assesses how such impositions affect the level of migration and the skill level of migrants. 
The desirable and undesirable effects of selective migration policies on the quality of migrants 
are studied by Bertoli et al. (2016). In this paper, we study the implications of introducing an 
entry fee from a different angle. 
We develop an analytical framework that enables us to compare two admission 
procedures: a selective quota based on skill type, and an entry fee (either uniform or 
differentiated). Under these two admission procedures we first study the impact of “opening 
up” to migration on the skill composition of the workforce in the receiving country, and we 
then assess which policy is better from the perspective of the native inhabitants (workers), 
henceforth natives, in that country. As a baseline, we consider a setting with no migration. 
Workers in a developed country are characterized by their endowments and preferences. They 
differ in their exogenously given skill level (productivity) and in the value that they attach to 
working in a prestigious occupation (occupational prestige); and they derive utility from 
consumption and from occupational prestige. A single consumption good is produced by 
workers of two types: “scientists” and “managers.” By raising the economy’s total factor 
productivity (TFP), scientists generate externalities that boost the productivity of the entire 
workforce. Working as a scientist confers prestige, whereas working as a manager does not. 
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However, managers are compensated for the lack of occupational prestige by earnings that are 
higher than those of scientists. Given this setting, we let the developed country receive 
migrants from a developing country under the two alternative admission procedures 
mentioned above.  
Our main findings are as follows. A uniform entry fee encourages self-selection such 
that most or all of the migrants are highly skilled managers. The (near) absence of migrant 
scientists has a negative effect on the productivity of the country’s workforce. Under a quota: 
the migrants are (a) only averagely skilled managers if the productivity externality generated 
by the scientists is weak, or (b) only averagely skilled scientists if the productivity externality 
generated by the scientists is strong. In (a), a uniform entry fee is preferable to a quota. In (b), 
a quota is preferable to a uniform entry fee. If, however, the entry fee for scientists is far 
enough below the entry fee for managers, then all or most migrants will be highly skilled 
scientists, rendering a differentiated entry fee preferable to a quota even when the productivity 
externality is strong. Instituting a differentiated fee comes, though, at a cost: the fee revenue is 
not as high as it will be when all or most migrants are managers. We conclude that if 
maximizing revenue from the entry fee is not the primary objective of the developed country, 
then a differentiated entry fee is the preferred policy. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a 
benchmark model of a developed country with no migration. In Section 3 we let the country 
“open up” to migration under a selective quota or under a uniform entry fee, and we study the 
extent to which the developed country can control the skill composition of migration under 
these two policies. In Section 4 we calculate the optimal level and skill composition of 
migration under a selective quota and under a uniform entry fee, and we compare these two 
policies. In Section 5 we compare a selective quota with a differentiated entry fee. In Section 
6 we bring entry fee revenue into the picture and study the extent to which the developed 
country can simultaneously maximize its fee revenue and attain the optimal size and skill 
composition of its workforce. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. A no-migration setting in a developed country 
Consider a developed country populated by a continuous set of individuals (workers) of 
measure one. Individuals in this country work in an occupation of their choice, and derive 
utility from consumption and occupational prestige. There are two occupations to choose 
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from: science, denoted by S, and management, denoted by M. Initially, individuals differ in 
their productivity in the labor market, and in their preference for occupational prestige. The 
utility function of an individual in occupation ,j S M=  is  
 ( )lnj ju c jκ ε= + ,  (1) 
where jc  denotes consumption, ( )jκ  is a function such that ( ) 1Sκ =  and ( ) 0Mκ = , and ε  
is a random variable defined over the interval [ ]0,E , E +∈R , with a probability distribution 
function and a cumulative distribution function denoted, respectively, by ( )f ⋅  and ( )F ⋅ , such 
that ( ) ( ) 0f z F z!= >  for all [ ]0,z E∈ . The variable ε  measures the individual’s preference 
for working in a prestigious occupation, with both ( ) 1Sκ =  and ( ) 0Mκ =  implying that 
only science is considered prestigious.2,3 That ε  varies across individuals reflects the 
observation that the value attached by individuals to working in a prestigious occupation 
depends on individual-specific characteristics such as personality, values, and family 
background.4 
The consumption of an individual is equal to his earnings, which, in turn, are given by 
the individual’s skill level, or productivity in the labor market, θ , times the wage per unit of 
productivity, jw , namely j jc wθ= . We assume that θ , which is the same in both 
occupations, is a random variable over the interval ( ]0,T , T +∈R , with a probability 
distribution function and a cumulative distribution function denoted, respectively, by ( )g ⋅  and 
( )G ⋅ , such that ( ) ( ) 0g z G z!= >  for all ( ]0,z T∈ . Mean productivity is ( )
0
1
T
g dθ θ θ θ= =∫ . 
                                               
2 According to a recent Harris Poll (Birth, 2016), working as a scientist in the US is ranked second in terms of 
occupational prestige, with 83 percent of the respondents considering that occupation prestigious, whereas the 
corresponding rank for a business executive is seventeen, with 59 percent of the respondents considering that 
occupation prestigious.  
3 It could be argued that if the notion of prestige is expanded to include other non-pecuniary job characteristics 
(such as power or control), then some individuals might prefer management to science (when earnings in the two 
occupations are controlled for). The results obtained in this paper carry through qualitatively to a setting in 
which some individuals prefer management to science (for the same level of wages in both occupations) if the 
share of such individuals is sufficiently small. Such an assumption seems plausible: despite a prevailing wage 
differential, a great many bright college graduates choose science rather than management. 
4 The construction of our model is inspired by the structure of the model of Fan and Stark (2011). In particular, 
the formulation of the utility function, as well as the properties of the preference towards one occupation as 
opposed to another, as delineated below, are akin to those in Fan and Stark (2011), with the difference that 
whereas Fan and Stark (2011) consider occupational stigma, we consider occupational prestige.  
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We assume that productivity and preference for occupational prestige are distributed 
independently in the population, namely that ( )cov , 0ε θ = .  
At the beginning of his life, each individual chooses his occupation by comparing 
utilities. Science will be preferred to management if  
 ( ) ( )ln lnS S M Mu w w uθ ε θ= + ≥ = , (2)  
or, equivalently, if 
 ln lnM Sw wε ≥ − . (3)  
Individuals for whom ln lnM Sw wε < −  will choose management. The supplies of scientists, 
s
SL , and of managers, 
s
ML , are, respectively,  
 ( ) ( )ln ln 1 ln lnsS M S M SL P w w F w wε= ≥ − = − −  and ( )ln lnsM M SL F w w= − , (4) 
where superscript s indicates supply. 
A large number of competitive firms employ scientists and managers to produce the 
economy’s consumption good, which is sold at a unit price. The production of firm i , iY , is  
 ( )( ) ( )1i Si Si Mi MiY A l L L
α α
θ θ
−
= , (5) 
where jiθ  denotes the average productivity of workers of type ,j S M=  employed by firm i, 
jiL  denotes the size of the workforce of type j employed by firm i, ji jiLθ  are the effective 
units of work of type j employed by firm i, and α  and 1 α− , 0 1α< < , are the output 
elasticities of scientific work and of managerial work, respectively.5 ( )A l , the economy’s 
total factor productivity (TFP) common to all the firms, depends on the effective units of 
scientific work in the economy’s workforce according to the function  
 ( ) S S
S S
LA l l
W L
η
η θ
θ
# $
= = % &
−( )
, (6) 
                                               
5 Even though productivity of an individual is the same in either occupation, the average productivity of workers 
employed by a single firm can vary between occupations. 
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where 1S Si Si
iS
L
L
θ θ= ∑  and S Si
i
L L=∑  are the average productivity and the aggregate size of 
the scientific workforce, respectively, W θ=  is the size of the effective workforce, and where 
0η > , a measure of the strength of the externality generated by the scientists, is a constant 
such that 1η α< − .  
Because there are many firms in the economy, the employment decisions of any single 
firm cannot dent the ratio of scientists to managers in the economy’s workforce; a single firm 
is too small to affect the ratio. A profit maximizing firm will employ effective units of work 
of type j up to the point at which the marginal product of the effective unit of work of each 
type is equal to the market wage per unit of productivity, namely up until 
 ( )
1
Mi Mi
S
Si Si
Lw A l
L
α
θ
α
θ
−
$ %
= & '
( )
 and ( ) ( )1 Si SiM
Mi Mi
Lw A l
L
α
θ
α
θ
# $
= − & '
( )
. (7) 
Upon dividing Mw  by Sw  in (7) and rearranging, we obtain the relative demand for the 
effective work of firm i, 
 
1
Si Si M
Mi Mi S
L w
L w
θ α
θ α
=
−
. (8)  
Because firms are identical and face the same market wages, it follows from (8) that the ratio 
of effective units of scientific work to effective units of managerial work employed by each 
firm is the same, which implies that this is also the market ratio, namely Si Si S S
Mi Mi M M
L L
L L
θ θ
θ θ
= , 
where 1M Mi Mi
iM
L
L
θ θ= ∑  is the average productivity of the managerial workforce, and 
M Mi
i
L L=∑  is the aggregate size of the managerial workforce. Therefore, we can replace the 
ratio of effective units of scientific work to effective units of managerial work employed by a 
particular firm in (7) and (8) with the ratio of the aggregate scientific workforce to the 
aggregate managerial workforce to obtain the profit maximization conditions  
 ( )
1
M M
S
S S
Lw A l
L
α
θ
α
θ
−
$ %
= & '
( )
 and ( ) ( )1 S SM
M M
Lw A l
L
α
θ
α
θ
# $
= − & '
( )
, (9) 
and the market relative demand for work 
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1
S S M
M M S
L w
L w
θ α
θ α
=
−
. (10)  
Because an individual’s occupational choice (3) depends on the wage per unit of productivity 
and on the individual’s preference for working in a prestigious occupation, but not on his 
productivity, the expected representation of individuals with different levels of productivity 
will be the same in the two occupations. We assume that the actual representation of the 
individuals in the two occupations is equal to the expected representation, which implies that 
1S Mθ θ θ= = = . Upon utilizing this together with the 1S ML L+ =  constraint on the size of the 
workforce, we get that (10) yields the aggregate demand for scientists and for managers, 
respectively: 
 
1
M
d S
S
M
S
w
wL w
w
α
α α
=
− +
 and 1
1
d
M
M
S
L w
w
α
α α
−
=
− +
, (11) 
where superscript d indicates demand. 
In equilibrium, s dj jL L=  and, therefore, from equalization of the left-hand sides, or, 
equivalently, of the right-hand sides of (4) with (11), we get that in equilibrium 
 ( ) 1ln ln
1
M S
M
S
F w w w
w
α
α α
−
− =
− +
. (12) 
We denote by w the wage ratio of managerial work to scientific work, M
S
ww
w
= . Utilizing this, 
(12) is rewritten as  
 ( ) 1ln
1
F w
w
α
α α
−
=
− +
. (13) 
And we denote by nw  the value of w that solves (13), where the superscript n indicates the 
equilibrium level of a variable in the no-migration setting. We now have the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1. (a) nw  exists, and is unique. (b) 1nw > . 
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.  
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Proposition 1 aligns with the principle of a “compensating wage differential,” which 
applies when there are non-pecuniary aspects of different occupations, in our case a prestige 
component in the individual’s utility function. Because 1
n
n M
n
S
ww
w
= > , managers are 
compensated for not working in a prestigious occupation by means of wages that are higher 
than those of scientists. 
Upon utilizing nw  in (4) and (11), we obtain  
 ( )1 ln 1
n
n n
S n
wL F w
w
α
α α
= − =
− +
 and ( ) 1ln 1
n n
M nL F w w
α
α α
−
= =
− +
, (14) 
where the middle parts of each of the expressions in (14) are the equilibrium supplies of 
scientific and managerial work, and where the right-hand parts are the equilibrium demands 
for scientific and managerial work, respectively. Thereafter, by inserting the right-hand sides 
of (14) into Sw  and Mw  in (9), and into ( )A l  in (6), we obtain, respectively, the equilibrium 
values of the wages paid per unit of scientific work and per unit of managerial work 
 ( ) ( ) 111n nSw w
α ηα ηα ηα α
+ −− −+= −  and ( ) ( )11n nMw w
α ηα ηα ηα α
+− −+= − . (15) 
 
3. Introducing migration 
In this section, we let the developed country, referred to henceforth as the “receiving” 
country, accept migrants from a developing country, referred to henceforth as the “sending” 
country, under two alternative migration regimes: a selective quota based on skill type, 
henceforth a quota, and a uniform (flat) entry fee. At this stage, we do not “allow” the 
receiving country to set different fees for different skill types. The reason for that is that we 
seek to highlight the importance of accounting for skill type heterogeneity in policy 
formation.6  
Let the workforce in the sending country consist of workers of the same two types as 
in the receiving country. The sending country is assumed to be less developed than the 
receiving country, which is reflected in lower wages of scientists and managers per unit of 
                                               
6 In a simple model with a single skill type we show that, unlike a quota, an entry fee can be used to attract the 
most productive migrants. The model is available on request. 
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productivity. To enable us to concentrate on essentials, we assume that the preference 
“premium” for working in a prestigious occupation, as well as the distribution of productivity 
in the labor market, are universal. The size of the migration inflow is expressed as a fraction 
of the native workforce (which, it will be recalled, is of measure one). We denote by SQ  the 
stock of migrant scientists, and by MQ  the stock of migrant managers admitted by the 
receiving country under a given migration admission policy. We assume that before the 
receiving country opens up to migration, the ratio of the wage (per unit of productivity) paid 
to managers in the sending country to the wage paid to scientists in that country is the same as 
the corresponding ratio of the wages in the receiving country, namely that 
 / 1F F F nM Sw w w w= = > ,  (16)  
where Fjw  is wage per unit of productivity paid to workers of type j in the sending country, 
F.7 From a rewrite of (16), and on recalling that n Fj jw w>  for ,j S M= , we get that 
 n F n FM M S Sw w w w− > − ,  (17) 
namely absent migration, the wage difference between the two countries is higher for 
managers than for scientists.8  
To further aid us focusing on essentials, we also assume that migration is small relative 
to the size of the workforce in the sending country, which implies that the wages of scientists 
and managers in that country are not affected by migration and can, thus, be considered 
exogenous to the model.9 Finally, we assume that the receiving country deciphers without cost 
                                               
7 This assumption is equivalent to assuming that both α and ( )F ⋅  are universal. 
8 It might be argued that scientific work is utilized more in production in a developed country than in a 
developing country ( Fα α> ), or that working as a scientist in a developed country is associated with greater 
prestige than working as a scientist in a developing country ( ( ) ( )FS Sκ κ> ). In such cases, the balance of the 
returns from migration will tilt in favor of scientific work. However, managers will continue to benefit more 
from migration if the production technologies in the two countries are not too distinct (if α  does not exceed Fα  
by too much) or if the gain in prestige reaped by scientists upon migration is not too large (if ( )Sκ  does not 
exceed ( )F Sκ  by too much).  
9 The assumption that migration will be small relative to the size of the workforce in the sending country is not 
crucial for this model; the results reported in this paper carry through qualitatively to the case with a relatively 
large flow of migrants. That wages in the sending country do not change on the departure of migrants, whereas 
the wages in the receiving country do change with the migrants’ arrival, is internally consistent if we assume that 
the workforce in the sending country is much larger than the workforce in the receiving country. In turn, it is 
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the skill type of migrants, but not their productivity (a migrant’s productivity is his private 
information). 
The purpose of this section is threefold. First, we study the composition of migration by 
skill type and by migrants’ productivity under two alternative migration policies set by the 
receiving country. Second, we investigate the impact of migration on the equilibrium in the 
labor market in that country under each migration policy. Third, we enlist results that will be 
used to study the repercussions of migration for the optimal skill composition of the 
workforce in the receiving country in Section 4. 
3.1. Migration under a quota 
The receiving country chooses the quota of migrant scientists, SQ , and the quota of migrant 
managers, MQ ; then, aware of the announced migration policy, the natives make their 
occupational choices. Upon the arrival of SQ  scientists and MQ  managers, there will be 
S S SL L Q= +  scientists and M M ML L Q= +  managers in the receiving country. Because the 
receiving country cannot select migrants by their productivity, and because the distribution of 
productivity in the sending country is the same as in the receiving country, the average 
productivity of the migrants will be the same as that of the natives, 1mθ θ= = , where 
superscript m indicates a magnitude that pertains to the migrants. Therefore, S S SL L Q= +  and 
M M ML L Q= +  also denote effective units of scientific work and of managerial work, 
respectively. The TFP under a quota is given by ( ) S
S
LA l
W L
η
" #
= $ %
−' (
, where 1 S MW Q Q= + +  
denotes the size of the effective workforce under a quota. As in the no-migration setting, firms 
employ effective units of scientific work and of managerial work up to the point where their 
marginal product equals their respective wages, and we assume that the firms are indifferent 
as to whether they employ a native or a migrant. By replicating the steps taken in the no-
migration setting, and upon adding the constraint on the size of the workforce, S ML L W+ = , 
we obtain the size of the scientific workforce and the size of the managerial workforce under 
a quota, namely 
                                                                                                                                                   
easy to justify this assumption if we treat the sending country as the rest of the world - a collection of countries 
that are less developed than the receiving country. 
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 ( )1 ln 1
q
q q
S S q
wL F w Q W
w
α
α α
= − + =
− +
 and ( ) 1ln 1
q q
M M qL F w Q Ww
α
α α
−
= + =
− +
, (18) 
and the wages paid per unit of productivity to the two types of workers, 
 ( ) ( ) 111q qSw w
α ηα ηα ηα α
+ −− −+= −  and ( ) ( )11q qMw w
α ηα ηα ηα α
+− −+= − , (19) 
where qw  constitutes the value of w which equates the supply of workers of each type with 
the demand for workers of each type, and where, henceforth, superscript q denotes the 
equilibrium level of a variable under a quota. By following a similar procedure as in the proof 
of Proposition 1, it can be shown that qw  exists, that it is unique, and that 1qw > .10,11  
Having established the size of the scientific workforce and the size of the managerial 
workforce in equilibrium under a quota, we ask how they relate to their counterparts in the no-
migration setting. We have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. Under a quota, as compared to the no-migration setting: (a) q nw w= , if the 
composition of migration by skill type is the same as the composition of the native workforce, 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
= ; (b) q nw w> , if the composition of migration by skill type is such that migrants are 
only or mostly scientists, 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
> ; (c) q nw w< , if the composition of migration by skill 
type is such that migrants are only or mostly managers, 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
< . 
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. 
Proposition 2 reveals how the composition of migration by skill type affects the ratio of 
the (per unit of productivity) wage of managers to the wage of scientists, which, as exhibited 
in (18) and (19), uniquely determines the division of the native workers between skill types 
and the wages per unit of productivity of the two skill types. When we divide the right-hand 
                                               
10 Unlike in the no-migration setting, under a quota it is possible that, in equilibrium, all the natives will choose 
the same occupation, in which case the other occupation will be manned entirely by migrants. Throughout we 
assume that not all the natives prefer the same occupation. We note that the reported results carry through 
qualitatively to the case in which all the natives choose the same occupation when migration becomes an option. 
11 We note that qw  is a function of SQ  and MQ . When modeling in Section 4 the optimal choice of the level and 
composition of migration by skill type, we allow SQ  and MQ , and thereby 
qw , to vary. Thereafter, for the sake 
of brevity, we will still use the notation qw  rather than ( ),q S Mw Q Q . 
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side of the first formula in (18) by the right-hand side of the second formula in (18), we get 
that qw  also determines the ratio of (the effective units of) scientific work to (the effective 
units of) managerial work. For example, for part (b) in Proposition 2, we have that fewer 
natives choose to become scientists, q nS SL L< ; the wages of scientists decrease, and the wages 
of managers increase, q nS Sw w<  and 
q n
M Mw w> , respectively; and the ratio of effective units of 
scientific work to managerial work increases, 
q n
S S
q n
M M
L L
L L
> . Thus, if the receiving country seeks 
to increase the share of (the effective units of work of) one skill type in its workforce, it 
should set a relatively large quota for that skill type, and a relatively small quota for the other 
skill type.  
3.2. Migration under a uniform entry fee  
Suppose now that the receiving country introduces a uniform entry fee: anyone who pays the 
fee, irrespective of the type of skill, can come. For a given entry fee, each worker in the 
sending country calculates his returns from migration net of the entry fee in order to 
determine whether migration pays off. Because scientists and managers experience the same 
level of occupational prestige in both countries, the reasons underlying the decision to migrate 
are purely pecuniary. An individual in the sending country will choose to migrate as long as 
the entry fee is lower than the gross gain in earnings upon migration, that is, as long as 
 
( )
( )
if he is a scientist
if he is a manager,
F m
S S
F m
M M
w w x
w w x
θ
θ
" − >$
%
− >$&
  (20) 
where x is the entry fee.  
We seek to find how the introduction of a uniform entry fee instead of a quota affects 
the composition of migration by skill type and the distribution of the migrants by their 
productivity, thus determining the equilibrium in the labor market of the receiving country. 
The timing of events is as follows. First, the receiving country sets the entry fee, bearing in 
mind that any individual will choose to migrate as long as his earnings net of the entry fee at 
destination are higher than his earnings at home. Then, the natives, aware of the level and 
composition by skill type of migration, make their occupational choices.  
We first inquire what the composition of migrants by skill type and by skill level will be 
under the uniform entry fee. We have the following result. 
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Proposition 3. Under a uniform entry fee: (a) the composition of migration by skill type is 
such that migrants are all or mostly managers, 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
< ; (b) for each fee-induced level of 
migration, the corresponding composition of migration by skill type is fixed; (c) migrants are 
of higher productivity than under a quota. 
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.  
The logic underlying part (a) of Proposition 3 is as follows. Under a uniform entry fee, 
the receiving country cannot admit exclusively scientists because no level of the entry fee 
renders it beneficial for scientists, but not for managers, to pay the fee and migrate. It is also 
impossible to increase the ratio of scientific work to managerial work over the corresponding 
ratio in the no-migration setting because when both skill types face the same entry fee, any 
decrease of the fee aimed at encouraging more scientists to come will also encourage more 
managers to come. It is a direct implication of part (b) of Proposition 3 that a uniform entry 
fee imposes limitations on the receiving country with respect to the set of feasible choices of 
the composition of migration by skill type. When the same fee applies to both skill types, 
fine-tuning the fee creates simultaneously incentives or disincentives to migrate for both skill 
types. Consequently, for a given overall level of migration, the composition of migration by 
skill type is fixed. The mechanism behind part (c) of Proposition 3 follows from (20): under a 
given uniform entry fee, only some foreign managers or only some foreign scientists are 
willing to migrate, and these are those whose productivity is sufficiently high. Thus, unlike 
under a quota where the group of migrants is a random selection of the foreign workers, an 
entry fee encourages positive self-selection by the migrants.12  
We proceed with determining the equilibrium in the labor market. Under a uniform 
entry fee, because the fee leads to self-selection by the migrants such that migrants are from 
the upper end of the distribution of productivity, the average productivity of the migrants will 
be higher than that of the natives, 1mjθ >  for ,j S M= . Moreover, because the wage per unit 
of productivity is different between scientists and managers, it follows from (20) that for two 
individuals with the same productivity but who work in different occupations, the decision 
whether to migrate might be different. For this reason, the average productivity of the 
migrants will not be equal for the two skill types, namely m mS Mθ θ≠ . Therefore, upon the 
                                               
12 How migrants self-select has recently been studied by Dequiedt and Zenou (2013). 
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arrival of SQ  scientists and MQ  managers, there will be ˆ
m
S S S SL L Qθ= +  effective units of 
scientific work, and ˆ mM M M ML L Qθ= +  effective units of managerial work in the receiving 
country. Because 1mjθ >  for ,j S M= , then, for a given level and composition of migration 
by skill type, there are more effective units of each skill type in the receiving country under a 
uniform entry fee than under a quota. The TFP under a uniform entry fee is given by 
( )
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ
S
S
LA l
W L
η
" #
= $ %
−' (
, where ˆ 1 m mS S M MW Q Qθ θ= + +  denotes the size of the effective workforce 
under a uniform entry fee. By replicating the steps taken in the no-migration setting and under 
a quota, and upon adding the constraint on the size of the effective workforce, ˆ ˆ ˆS ML L W+ = , 
we obtain the size of the effective workforce of scientists and the size of the effective 
workforce of managers under a uniform entry fee, namely 
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, (21)  
and the wages paid per unit of productivity to the two types of workers, 
 ( ) ( ) 111uef uefSw w
α ηα ηα ηα α
+ −− −+= −  and ( ) ( )11uef uefMw w
α ηα ηα ηα α
+− −+= − , (22) 
where uefw  constitutes the value of w which equates the supplies of effective units of work of 
each type with their demands, and where, henceforth, superscript uef denotes the equilibrium 
level of a variable under a uniform entry fee.  
We now compare the repercussions of implementing a uniform entry fee and a quota for 
the equilibrium in the labor market of the receiving country. From Proposition 3 we know that 
if the receiving country seeks to increase the share of effective units of scientific work in its 
workforce, it cannot do that by means of a uniform entry fee. However, if it seeks to increase 
the share of effective units of managerial work in its workforce, it can achieve that by means 
of either a quota or a uniform entry fee. Therefore, a meaningful comparison to perform is 
between a uniform entry fee and a quota, controlling for the level and composition by skill 
type of migration (which can be the same under the two policies). Clearly, the productivity of 
the migrants will be different under the two policies. We then have the following proposition. 
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Proposition 4. uef q nw w w< <  if migration is of the same level and composition by skill type 
under a quota as under a uniform entry fee.  
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. 
From Proposition 4 it follows that opening up to migration under a uniform entry fee 
brings about changes in the labor market that are akin to those resulting from opening up to 
migration under a quota, when most or all migrants are managers (cf. part (c) of Proposition 
2). That uef qw w<  is a direct result of the fact that the average productivity of the migrants is 
higher under a uniform entry fee than under a quota, which strengthens the impact of 
migration on the wages of both skill types in the receiving country as compared to a quota. 
When applied to (21) and (22), and compared, respectively, with (18) and (19), and with (14) 
and (15), the inequalities in uef q nw w w< <  establish that under a uniform entry fee, for 
migration of the same level and composition by skill type as under a quota, more natives 
choose to become scientists, uef q nS S SL L L> > , the wage per unit of scientific work is higher, and 
the wage per unit of managerial work is lower, namely uef q nS S Sw w w> >  and 
uef q n
M M Mw w w< < , 
respectively. Also, when we divide the right-hand sides of the first formulas in (21), (18), and 
(14) by the right-hand sides of the second formulas in (21), (18), and (14), respectively, and 
invoke uef q nw w w< < , we get that a uniform entry fee leads to the lowest ratio of effective 
units of scientific work to managerial work. Therefore, when the objective of the receiving 
country is to increase the share of (the effective units of) managerial work in its workforce, a 
uniform entry fee is more effective than a quota, because migration “delivers” more 
productive workers under the former policy than under the latter. However, if the receiving 
country seeks to increase the share of (the effective units of) scientific work in its workforce, 
it should not enact a uniform entry fee. 
 
4. A quota vs. a uniform entry fee: The optimal policy  
Which of the two policies considered in Section 3 should the receiving country adopt when its 
objective is to improve the welfare of the native population? To make this assessment, we 
introduce a measure of the welfare of the natives of the receiving country: a utilitarian social 
welfare function, SWF, defined as  
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where superscript , ,k n q uef=  indicates the type of equilibrium; where the boundaries of the 
integrals are yielded by ( ]0,Tθ ∈  and [ ]0,Eε ∈ , and upon recalling that the individuals for 
whom ln ln lnk k kM Sw w wε < − =  will choose management, whereas the individuals for whom 
ln kwε ≥  will choose science.13,14  
In this section, we first search for the level and skill composition of migration that 
maximize the welfare of the natives of the receiving country under a quota and under a 
uniform entry fee, and we next ask which of the two policies delivers a higher maximum 
welfare level.  
We assume that, combined, the migration of scientists and managers cannot exceed the 
limit Q, namely that S MQ Q Q+ ≤ .
15 We consider only the impact of migration on the welfare 
of the natives via the labor market effects, referring to the SWF as displayed in (23), not 
taking into account the entry fee revenue; the revenue effect will be considered in Section 6. 
 
                                               
13 Managing migration as a policy tool for enhancing welfare has been at the core of several papers that study the 
welfare of the population of the sending country (Stark and Wang, 2002; Fan and Stark, 2007a, 2007b; Bertoli 
and Brücker, 2011; Stark et al., 2012; Stark and Zakharenko, 2012; Byra, 2013), and that study the welfare of the 
population of both the receiving country and the sending country (Stark et al., 2009a., 2009b, 2012). 
14 In (23), SQ  and MQ  are control (exogenous) variables not only under a quota, but also under a uniform entry 
fee. Formally, under a uniform entry fee the control variable (namely the instrument of migration policy 
controlled by the receiving country) is the fee, x, and SQ  and MQ  are its functions. However, because SQ  and 
MQ  are monotonically decreasing in x, there are only one value of SQ  and one value of MQ  that correspond to a 
given x, and vice versa. Therefore, when calculating the optimal solution, we can just as well reverse the 
causality, namely treat SQ  and MQ  as control variables themselves, as long as they are interdependent as per 
part (b) of Proposition 3, and we can then determine the fee that corresponds to the chosen SQ  and MQ . We take 
this approach especially because it renders the results obtained in the quota setting and in the uniform entry fee 
setting comparable. And we adhere to this approach also in Section 5, where we introduce a differentiated entry 
fee.  
15 The exogenous limit to the level of migration stems from the negative effects associated with a large inflow of 
migrants, that are not modeled-in. Those considerations might include, for example, increasing income 
inequality between natives and migrants, when the optimal migration policy mandates specialization by skill 
type of the migrants, which, as we further show, is the case. Other reasons might include the integration efforts 
of migrants, which are likely to decrease with the size of the migrant population. Q might be driven by a 
political-economy process where the natives have taken all these effects into account. 
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4.1. Optimal migration under a quota 
Under a quota, the objective of the receiving country is to maximize (23), using SQ  and MQ  
as choice variables. The outcome of the receiving country’s maximization problem is 
presented in the following proposition.  
Proposition 5. Under a quota, the receiving country attains the optimal skill composition of 
its workforce (it maximizes SWF) when the level of migration is at the limit S MQ Q Q+ = , 
and when the composition of migration by skill type is such that the migrants are 
(a)  all scientists, namely 0MQ = , if ( ) ( ),0 0,q qSWF Q SWF Q> ;  
(b)  all managers, namely 0SQ = , if ( ) ( ),0 0,q qSWF Q SWF Q< . 
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. 
Proposition 5 reveals that the welfare of the natives under a quota is strictly higher than 
in the no-migration setting because optimally, the receiving country will not elect to have no 
migrant scientists and no migrant managers. That the optimal skill composition of the 
workforce is attained under full specialization by skill type of the migrants up to the quota 
limit is quite intuitive. When migration is of level Q and consists exclusively of scientists or 
exclusively of managers, then the decline in the wages of the native workers of the same skill 
type as that of the migrants, and the increase in the wages of the native workers of the other 
skill type, are both more substantial than under migration of any other level and composition 
by skill type. However, because migrants “push” natives from the occupation that suffers a 
decline in wages into the occupation that experiences an increase in wages, the proportion of 
those who sustain a loss on account of lower wages declines with the level of migration (and 
is the lowest under migration of level Q).16  
                                               
16 Corner solutions, such as the one reported in Proposition 5, are not uncommon in the received migration 
policy literature. For example, in a political economy setting, Benhabib (1996) shows that the population of the 
migrant receiving country will be polarized in terms of the preferred migration policy, with one section of the 
population opting for admitting migrants with as much capital as possible, and with the remainder section 
preferring to admit migrants with as little capital as possible. Which of these two policies ends up being 
implemented depends on the size of the two sections. In yet another political economy setting, Ortega (2010) 
shows that when the native workforce consists of skilled and unskilled workers, and when citizenship is not 
granted to the children of migrants who are born in the host country (so as to avoid them voting against the 
interests of the unskilled native workers), then the preference of the unskilled native workers is to admit only 
skilled migrants. This preference is formed when the wages of unskilled native workers increase with the size of 
the skilled workforce, and when income redistribution (in a welfare state) from skilled workers to unskilled 
native workers is increasing with these wages.  
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Proposition 5 narrows the set of potentially optimal realizations in the level and 
composition by skill type of migration to only two, yet it does not provide us with a means of 
selecting between the realizations (other than a comparison of the values of the SWF). In 
general, we cannot specify when it is better to admit exclusively scientists or exclusively 
managers, because the choice of whom to admit evolves from the interaction between the 
returns from science and the preference for occupational prestige among the natives. 
However, we can be specific when the limit to the level of migration is relatively small. 
Under such a constellation we show how the choice of the preferred skill type of migrants 
varies with the strength of the externality generated by the scientists.  
We calculate the maximal level of migration for which we can identify the preferred 
skill type of migrants exclusively by referring to the strength of the externality. We denote by 
1Q  the limit to the level of migration such that  
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That is, 1Q  is a specific value of the limit to the level of migration such that if the externality 
is relatively weak (strong), and if migration is of level 1Q  with only scientists (managers) 
migrating, then the welfare of the natives, as represented by (23), is the same as in the no-
migration setting. (When nSLη α= − , there is no positive value of 1Q  for which the levels of 
the SWF in the two settings are equal.) We now have the following lemma and proposition.  
Lemma 1. 1Q  exists, and is unique. 
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. 
Proposition 6. Under a quota, when 1Q Q≤ , the receiving country attains the optimal skill 
composition of its workforce (it maximizes SWF) when the level of migration is at the limit 
S MQ Q Q+ = , and when the composition of migration by skill type is such that the migrants 
are  
(a)  all scientists, namely 0MQ = , if the externality generated by the scientists is 
sufficiently strong, that is, if nSLη α> − ; 
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(b)  all managers, namely 0SQ = , if the externality generated by the scientists is 
sufficiently weak, that is, if nSLη α< − . 
Proof. The proof follows from the intersection of Proposition 5, (24), and Claim 3 
(incorporated in the proof of Lemma 1). Q.E.D. 
Proposition 6 underscores the role of the externality generated by the scientists in 
combination with full specialization by skill type of the group of migrants up to the quota 
limit in determining the optimal skill composition of the workforce in the receiving country. 
When this externality is weak, migration exclusively of managers results in an optimal skill 
composition of the workforce. When this externality is strong, it is migration exclusively of 
scientists that attains that goal.  
To discern why the choice of the preferred type of skill of migrants depends on the 
strength of the externality generated by the scientists, we need to identify the positive and 
negative effects associated with the migration of scientists only, and likewise with the 
migration of managers only. As already noted, when migration is specialized by skill type, the 
wages paid to the same skill type as that of the migrants decrease, whereas the wages paid to 
the other skill type increase, thus “pushing” the natives from the occupation that suffers a 
decline in wages into the occupation that experiences an increase in wages. This “crowding 
out effect” is stronger when the natives are being driven into science rather than into 
management, due to the shape of the utility function: a utility increase of low-earning 
scientists in response to a marginal increase in their wage is higher than a utility increase of 
high-earning managers in response to the same stimulus. By admitting only managers, the 
receiving country ensures that the natives specialize in science and, thus, that they are the 
ones who experience a large increase in utility, benefiting from the “crowding out effect.” 
However, such migration entails a decrease in the share of scientists in the receiving country’s 
workforce, thereby reducing the country’s TFP, lowering the earnings of the natives and of 
the migrants alike. By admitting only scientists rather than only managers, the receiving 
country benefits from the “TFP effect,” at the cost of driving the natives into managerial 
occupations, who thereby forfeit the utility gain from the “crowding out effect.” Which of the 
two effects dominates depends on the strength of the externality generated by the scientists, 
η , and on how much the wages of scientists and managers differ in equilibrium, as delineated 
by nSL α− , which measures the “crowding out effect” (noting that 
n
SL α−  maps onto the ratio 
of the wage per unit of productivity of managerial work to scientific work through (10)).  
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Figure 1 illustrates how the optimal choice of the skill type of the migrants depends on 
the strength of the externality when 1Q Q≤ . Lighter colors indicate higher values of the social 
welfare function. It is better to pursue migration of only managers under the specifications 
used to draw Figure 1(a), whereas it is better to pursue migration of only scientists under the 
specifications used to draw Figure 1(b). 
 
      
(a) Weak externality         (b) Strong externality 
Figure 1. The values of the SWF under a quota as a function of the level of migration of 
scientists and of managers. 
Note: Figure 1 is drawn for a uniform distribution of ε  on the interval [ ]0,1 , and for values of the parameters 
0.5α = , and 0.2Q = . In drawing panel (a), we assume that 0.06η = ; in drawing panel (b), we assume that 
0.16η = . (For drawing this Figure, the distribution of θ  is immaterial.) 
4.2. Optimal migration under a uniform entry fee 
We now ask what level and composition of migration by skill type and by productivity 
achieve the optimal skill composition of the workforce under a uniform entry fee.17 Because 
migrants are more productive under a uniform fee than under a quota, then for a given level 
and composition of migration by skill type, the value of the SWF under the former policy will 
differ from its value under the latter policy. Consequently, the maximal level of migration for 
which we can identify the preferred skill type of migrants exclusively by referring to the 
                                               
17 Recalling the clarification in footnote 14, our usage of SQ  and MQ  as control variables instead of usage of the 
fee, x, leads to the same optimal solution as does usage of x as a control variable. 
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strength of the externality will differ as well. We denote by 2Q  the limit to the level of 
migration such that  
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 (25) 
and by x  the level of the (uniform) entry fee below which scientists find it beneficial to 
migrate alongside managers. We now have the following lemma and proposition. 
Lemma 2. (a) 2Q  exists, and is unique. (b) 2 1Q Q<  if 
n
SLη α> − ; 2 1Q Q=  if 
n
SLη α≤ − . 
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. 
Proposition 7. Under a uniform entry fee, when 2Q Q≤ , the receiving country attains the 
optimal skill composition of its workforce (it maximizes SWF) when  
(a)  the level of migration is zero, 0S MQ Q= = , if the externality generated by the 
scientists is sufficiently strong, that is, if nSLη α> − ; 
(b)  the level of migration is at ( ){ }min ,Q x Q , if the externality generated by the 
scientists is sufficiently weak, that is, if nSLη α< − . 
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. 
Part (a) of Proposition 7 implies that by setting the fee so as to allow some migration, 
the receiving country will act against the goal of attaining the optimal skill composition of its 
workforce. This implication is due to the negative impact of migrant managers on TFP in the 
receiving country: when the externality generated by the scientists is strong, then the “TFP 
effect” is stronger than the “crowding out effect” and, thus, the migration of managers reduces 
the welfare of the natives. Part (b) of Proposition 7 indicates that when the externality 
generated by the scientists is weak, it is optimal to admit as many managers as possible and 
only managers. Once scientists too find it beneficial to migrate, additional migration will no 
longer bring about the desired “crowding out effect” and, thus, is not optimal. 
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4.3. Choosing the optimal migration policy 
We now inquire which of the two migration policies fares better as a tool for attaining the 
optimal skill composition of the workforce in the receiving country. We have the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 8. From the perspective of the receiving country, when 2Q Q≤ , the receiving 
country attains the optimal skill composition of its workforce (it maximizes SWF) under  
(a)  a quota, if the externality generated by the scientists is sufficiently strong, that is, 
if nSLη α> − , or if the externality generated by the scientists is sufficiently weak 
and the size of migration is sufficiently large, that is, if nSLη α< −  and 
( )mMQ Q xθ> ; 
(b)  a uniform entry fee, if the externality generated by the scientists is sufficiently 
weak and the size of migration is sufficiently small, that is, if nSLη α< −  and 
( )mMQ Q xθ< . 
Proof. The proof follows from combining the proofs of Propositions 6 and 7. Q.E.D. 
That a uniform entry fee is strictly preferable to a quota if the externality generated by 
the scientists is weak stems from the positive self-selection by the migrants under the former 
policy, which strengthens the “crowding out effect.” However, if that externality is strong, by 
implementing a uniform entry fee rather than a quota, the receiving country acts against the 
welfare interest of the natives, as it forfeits the TFP boost that it would have enjoyed under a 
quota. The latter policy will also be preferable to the uniform entry fee if under a quota the 
receiving country optimally admits more effective units of managerial work than under a 
uniform entry fee, namely if ( )mMQ Q xθ> .  
To gain further insight into which of the two policies is more likely to be preferable in 
attaining the optimal skill composition of the workforce, we present an illustrative calculation 
based on US data. From Proposition 8 we know that a quota should be chosen if the “TFP 
effect” is stronger than the “crowding out effect,” that is, if nSLη α> − . On the basis of 
empirical studies, we assessed numerically the two sides of this inequality (details are in 
Appendix B). With 0.042α =  and with 0.061qSL = , which we can use instead of 
n
SL  because 
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in the case of the US q nS SL L> , it follows that the US should aim at increasing the share of 
scientists among migrants if 0.019η > . The indirect methods of evaluating η  on the basis of 
empirical studies (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; Peri et al., 2015) indicate that, for the US, η  
exceeds 0.019 . In the specific case of the US, imposition of a uniform entry fee instead of a 
quota would cause adjustments in the country’s labor market that are disadvantageous to the 
welfare of its natives.  
In Table 1 we present evidence on the balance of foreign-born individuals in the 
workforces of selected countries, and among scientists and managers in the countries. In all 
the reported countries, the share of the foreign-born among scientists exceeds the share of the 
foreign-born in the overall workforce.18 In contrast, the share of the foreign-born among 
managers is about the same as or lower than the share of the foreign-born in the overall 
workforce. If the reported countries were to adopt a uniform entry fee, then the balance of the 
foreign-born between the two professions could be reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
18 Hanson and Slaughter (2015) report that the share of foreign-born workers among STEM workers (Scientists, 
Technology professionals, Engineers, and Mathematicians) in the US is higher than their share in the overall 
workforce. 
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Table 1. Foreign-born as a percent of workers in selected countries. 
Source: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries, 2010-2011. 
Notes: 
1. Scientists are defined as follows: 
  -  codes 21 (Physical, Mathematical and Engineering Science Professionals) and 22 (Life Science and Health 
Professionals) for Australia and Ireland;  
  -  codes 21 (Science and Engineering Professionals) and 22 (Health Professionals) for Canada and Norway; 
  -  codes 23 (Design, Engineering, Science and Transport Professionals), 25 (Health Professionals), and 26 
(Information and Communications Technology Professionals) for New Zealand; 
  -  codes 15 (Computer and Mathematical Occupations), 17 (Architecture and Engineering Occupations), and 19 
(Life, Physical and Social Science Occupation) for the US.  
2. Managers are defined as follows: 
  -  codes 12 (Corporate Managers) and 13 (General Managers) for Australia and Ireland; 
  -  codes 12 (Administrative and Commercial Managers), 13 (Production and Specialized Services Managers),  
and 14 (Hospitality, Retail and Other Services Managers) for Canada and Norway; 
  -  code 11 (Chief Executives, General Managers and Legislators) for New Zealand; 
  -  code 11 (Management Occupations) for the US. 
 
5. Migration under a differentiated entry fee 
In Section 3 we have shown that under a uniform entry fee, the receiving country faces 
limitations to the choice of the composition of migration by skill type; under such policy, it 
can encourage migration only or mostly of managers, which renders the policy unfit for the 
task of improving the skill composition of the workforce in the receiving country, if the 
externality generated by the scientists is sufficiently strong, which, as shown in Section 4.3, is 
a reasonable assumption to make. It stands to reason that by setting different fees for different 
skill types, the receiving country could overcome those limitations. Let then the receiving 
country introduce instead of a single uniform entry fee of x, two distinct fees for the two skill 
Country Foreign-born as a percent of workers 
Foreign-born as a 
percent of scientists 
Foreign-born as a 
percent of managers 
Australia 27.73 41.46 28.79 
Canada 22.77 28.82 23.45 
Ireland 21.12 25.90 19.08 
Norway 10.20 14.36 5.40 
New Zealand 28.42 38.30 27.06 
US 17.61 21.84 13.31 
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types: Sx  for scientists, and Mx  for managers. In such a setting, an individual in the sending 
country will pay the fee and migrate as long as the fee is lower than his returns from 
migration, that is, as long as 
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We first ask what composition of migration by skill type and by productivity will be brought 
about by a differentiated entry fee. We have the following proposition. 
Proposition 9. Under a differentiated entry fee: (a) the receiving country can encourage the 
migration of any mix of scientists and managers; (b) the migrants are of higher productivity 
than under a quota. 
Proof. (a) From (26) it follows straightforwardly that migration by each skill type depends on 
the entry fee set for the skill type. (b) Whereas under a quota the migrants constitute a random 
selection from the workforce of the sending country, under a differentiated entry fee the 
migrants’ skill level is higher than a certain threshold, as defined by (26). Q.E.D. 
What follows from part (a) of Proposition 9 is that under a differentiated entry fee, the 
receiving country does not face limitations to the choice of the composition of migration by 
skill type that are present under a uniform entry fee, thus it can replicate any choice of 
composition by skill type of migration set under a quota. As far as the migrants’ productivity 
is concerned (part (b) of Proposition 9), it follows from (26) that just as under a uniform entry 
fee, in this setting too we have a positive self-selection by the migrants: migrants are from the 
upper end of the productivity distribution. 
Under a differentiated entry fee there will be ˆ mS S S SL L Qθ= +  effective units of 
scientific work and ˆ mM M M ML L Qθ= +  effective units of managerial work in the receiving 
country, where 1mSθ >  and 1
m
Mθ > . Again, all equilibrium values of the model’s endogenous 
variables are identified by the wage ratio of managerial work to scientific work, which we 
denote as defw , with superscript def indicating the equilibrium level of a variable under a 
differentiated entry fee. The equations describing the equilibrium in the labor market are the 
same as under a uniform entry fee, namely (21) and (22). The following proposition relates 
the equilibrium values of variables under a differentiated entry fee to the respective values 
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under a quota of the same level and composition of migration by skill type, and in the no-
migration setting.19 
Proposition 10. Under a differentiated entry fee, as compared to a quota for which migration 
is of the same level, and to the no-migration setting: (a) def q nw w w= = , if 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
= ; (b) 
def q nw w w> > , if all migrants are scientists; (c) def q nw w w< < , if all migrants are managers. 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4. 
Just as under a uniform entry fee, under a differentiated entry fee the repercussions of 
opening up to migration are of a higher magnitude than when opening up to migration under a 
quota. The reason for this result is also the same, and follows from the positive self-selection 
by the migrants. We consider case (b) in Proposition 10. When applied to (21) and (22), and 
compared, respectively, with (18) and (19), and with (14) and (15), the inequalities in 
def q nw w w> >  establish that under a differentiated entry fee, for migration of only scientists 
of the same level as under a quota, we get that fewer natives choose to become scientists, 
def q n
S S SL L L< < , the wages (per unit of productivity) of scientists are lower and the wages of 
managers are higher, def q nS S Sw w w< <  and 
def q n
M M Mw w w> > , respectively, and the ratio of 
effective units of scientific work to managerial work is higher. For case (c), we have the 
opposite results. 
We now ask whether a differentiated entry fee fares better than a quota in securing the 
optimal skill composition of the workforce in the receiving country. We denote by 3Q  the 
limit to the level of migration such that  
 
( )
( )
3 3
3 3
3
0   and   ,0 , if   
0   and   0, , if   
0, if   .
def n n
S
def n n
S
n
S
Q SWF Q SWF L
Q SWF Q SWF L
Q L
η α
η α
η α
# > = < −
%%
> = > −&
%
= = −%'
 (27) 
We have the following lemma and propositions. 
Lemma 3. (a) 3Q  exists, and is unique. (b) 3 1Q Q< . 
                                               
19 Clearly, because a uniform entry fee can be conceived as a special case of a differentiated entry fee, the 
uniform entry fee can at best be as good as the differentiated entry fee. Therefore, in what follows, we do not 
compare a differentiated entry fee with a uniform entry fee. 
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Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 2. 
Proposition 11. Under a differentiated entry fee, when 3Q Q≤ , the receiving country attains 
the optimal skill composition of its workforce (it maximizes SWF) when the level of 
migration is at the limit S MQ Q Q+ = , and when the composition of migration by skill type is 
such that the migrants are  
(a)  all scientists, namely 0MQ = , if the externality generated by the scientists is 
sufficiently strong, that is, if nSLη α> − ; 
(b)  all managers, namely 0SQ = , if the externality generated by the scientists is 
sufficiently weak, that is, if nSLη α< − . 
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. 
Proposition 12. From the perspective of the natives of the receiving country, an optimal 
differentiated entry fee is strictly preferable to an optimal quota.  
Proof. The proof is straightforward. 
Proposition 11 indicates that under a differentiated entry fee, the receiving country should set 
the fees so as to encourage the same level and composition of migration by skill type as is 
optimal under a quota. If it does so, then the resulting skill composition of the workforce in 
the receiving country will be more beneficial to the natives than that which obtains for an 
optimal quota (cf. Proposition 12). This is so because of the positive self-selection by the 
migrants, which strengthens the “TFP effect” when the externality generated by the scientists 
is strong, or the “crowding out effect” when that externality is weak. 
The results of Proposition 11 regarding the optimal level of migration and of its 
composition by skill type can be expressed in terms of the corresponding entry fees. A 
summary of the optimal entry fees, conditional on the strength of the externality, is provided 
in Table 2, where mjθ  stands for the skill level of an individual whose skill type is j and who is 
indifferent between paying the fee and not migrating and where, to recall, T is the migrant 
with the highest skill level.  The entry fee for managers when the externality is strong, and the 
entry fee for scientists when the externality is weak, are given as the minimum fees needed to 
discourage workers of each skill type from migration, as indicated by the strict inequality 
signs in the respective optimal entry fees in the second and third columns of Table 2. The 
28 
 
entry fee for the scientists when the externality is strong, and the entry fee for the managers 
when the externality is weak, ensure that exactly Q scientists or Q managers will pay the fee. 
 The optimal entry fee for 
Strength of the externality Scientists ( Sx ) Managers ( Mx ) 
n
SLη α> −  ( )( ) ( ),0 ,0F mS S S Sx w Q w Qθ= −  ( )( ),0 FM M Mx w Q w T> −  
n
SLη α< −  ( )( )0, FS S Sx w Q w T> −  ( )( ) ( )0, 0,F mM M M Mx w Q w Qθ= −  
Table 2. Optimal differentiated entry fees. 
 
6. Attaining optimal skill composition of the workforce vs. maximizing the entry fee 
revenue  
It might be tempting for the receiving country, when it pursues an entry fee policy, to set the 
fees so as to maximize revenue. In this section we ask whether under a differentiated entry fee 
maximization of the entry fee revenue aligns with maximization of the SWF. We have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 13. The highest revenue is attained when migrants are only or mostly managers, 
namely when 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
< .  
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A. 
Proposition 13 together with part (a) of Proposition 3 imply that a revenue-maximizing 
country will not want to introduce a differentiated entry fee, or that it will differentiate the fee 
only slightly. By attracting only or mostly managers, a revenue-maximizing country will 
attain optimal (or close to optimal) skill composition of its workforce only if the externality 
generated by the scientists is weak (cf. Proposition 11). If that externality is strong, however, 
then by setting the fees that yield the highest possible revenue, the receiving country will 
forfeit the optimal skill composition of its workforce, because such a composition will require 
migrants to be all scientists. We conclude that if the externality generated by the scientists is 
strong, then the revenue maximization comes at a cost of inducing unfavorable changes in the 
skill composition of the receiving country’s workforce. Seen from a different perspective, 
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attaining the optimal skill composition of the country’s workforce, which requires all migrants 
to be scientists, comes at a cost of foregone revenue that could be obtained if the migrants 
were all or mostly managers. 
Under the objective of the maximization of revenue, the optimal entry fees depend on 
the rate at which the entry fee for managers needs to be lowered to encourage a marginal 
increase in the size of managerial migration, and on the rate at which the migration premium 
for scientists increases in response to a decrease in the scientists-to-managers ratio brought 
about by the increase of managerial migration. Both rates depend on the distributions of 
prestige and of productivity. These dependences render it impossible to present a Table that is 
analogous to Table 2. Still, because revenue maximization requires migrants to be all or 
mostly managers, the optimal entry fees needed to maximize the entry fee revenue will be 
either the same or close to the ones reported in Table 2 for the case of weak externality. 
 
7. Conclusions 
It can reasonably be expected that when a receiving country charges for the right to work 
within its borders, it will attract the most productive individuals who will generate the highest 
returns from the investment in the entry fee. We showed why this expectation is only a 
fragment of the overall picture. We constructed a model which we used to assess the 
implications of selling the right to enter a receiving country, as opposed to administering a 
quota, under the assumption that migrants are heterogeneous not only in skill level but also in 
skill type, and that one skill type, scientists, confers positive production externality, whereas 
the other, managers, does not.  
We found that under a quota, the receiving country will optimally control the level of 
migration as little as possible and that it will admit only scientists or only managers, 
depending on whether the production externality is strong or weak, respectively. The 
disadvantage of a quota is that it does not encourage desirable self-selection by the migrants. 
By contrast, when enacting a uniform entry fee, the receiving country can select migrants by 
skill level, but not by skill type: it will attract only those highly skilled foreign workers who 
generate the highest returns from incurring the entry fee; in our case these are only or mostly 
managers. A comparison of a uniform entry fee with a quota yields the result that the former 
is better when the production externality generated by the scientists is weak, whereas when 
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this externality is strong, the ranking reverses. Illustrative calculations suggest that in the case 
of the US, the externality generated by the scientists is strong. 
By setting different fees for different skill types, the receiving country can overcome the 
limitations it faces under a uniform entry fee: it can select migrants by skill level and by skill 
type. This renders a differentiated fee strictly preferable to a quota if the aim of the receiving 
country is to attain the optimal skill composition of its workforce rather than to maximize its 
entry fee revenue. However, if the receiving country seeks to maximize its entry fee revenue 
and if the externality generated by the scientists is strong, then the pursuit of such a 
maximization does not deliver the optimal skill composition of its workforce.  
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Appendix A  
For ease of reference, prior to providing proofs we replicate the propositions and lemmas 
presented in the body of the paper.  
Proposition 1. (a) nw  exists, and is unique. (b) 1nw > . 
Proof. (a) Let ( ) 1
1
b w
w
α
α α
−
=
− +
. Note that nw  is defined as a solution to  
 ( ) ( )lnF w b w= , (A1) 
in which case the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (A1) are the equilibrium supply of 
and the equilibrium demand for managerial work in the no-migration setting, respectively. To 
prove the existence of nw , we note that for 0 1w e= =  we have that ( ) ( )ln1 0 1 1F bα= < − = , 
whereas for Ew e=  we have that ( ) ( )11 1
E
EF E b ee
α
α α
−
= > =
− +
. From the continuity of 
( )F ⋅  and ( )b ⋅  it follows that there exists ( )1,n Ew e∈  such that nw  is the solution to (A1). 
Furthermore, because ( ) ( )ln lnF w F w
w w
!∂
=
∂
( )ln 0f w
w
= > , and because 
( ) ( )
( )2
1
0
1
b w
w
α α
α α
−
# = − <
− +
, the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (A1) cross exactly 
once, which guarantees uniqueness of the solution to (A1).   
(b) Because ( )1,n Ew e∈  where E +∈R , as shown in part (a) of this proof, it follows that 
1nw > . Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2. Under a quota, as compared to the no-migration setting: (a) q nw w= , if the 
composition of migration by skill type is the same as the composition of the native workforce, 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
= ; (b) q nw w> , if the composition of migration by skill type is such that migrants are 
only or mostly scientists, 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
> ; (c) q nw w< , if the composition of migration by skill 
type is such that migrants are only or mostly managers, 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
< . 
Proof. We first present and prove a claim. 
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Claim 1. 0
q
S
w
Q
∂
>
∂
 and 0
q
M
w
Q
∂
<
∂
. 
Proof. Recalling that ( ) 1
1
b w
w
α
α α
−
=
− +
, consider the function 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , ln 1S M M M SB w Q Q F w Q b w Q Q= + − + + . (A2)  
Because qw  is defined as a solution to ( ), , 0S MB w Q Q =  (cf. (18)), in which case the right- 
hand side of (A2) is the difference between the equilibrium supply of and the equilibrium 
demand for managerial work under a quota, it follows that ( ), , 0q S MB w Q Q ≡ . Applying the 
implicit function theorem to ( ), ,q S MB w Q Q  yields S
q
q
Q
S w
Bw
Q B
∂
= −
∂
, where 
SQ
B  and qwB  are the 
first derivatives of ( ), ,q S MB w Q Q  with respect to SQ  and qw , respectively. Because 
 ( ) 0
S
q
QB b w= − < , (A3) 
and because  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 ln 1 1 0q q q q M SqwB f w b w b w Q Qw ! "= + − + + >$ % , (A4) 
it follows that 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
0
ln 1 1
q qq
q q q
S M S
b w ww
Q f w b w b w Q Q
∂
= >
∂ + − + +
. 
Applying the implicit function theorem to ( ), ,q S MB w Q Q  once again yields 
M
q
q
Q
M w
Bw
Q B
∂
= −
∂
, where 
MQ
B  is the first derivative of ( ), ,q S MB w Q Q  with respect to MQ . 
Because 
 ( )1 0
M
q
QB b w= − > , (A5)  
and recalling (A4), it follows that 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1
0
ln 1 1
q qq
q q q
M M S
b w ww
Q f w b w b w Q Q
−∂
= − <
∂ + − + +
. 
Q.E.D. 
We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 2. 
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(a) When 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
= , using the relationship 1n nS ML L+ =  we can rewrite (A2) as  
  ( ) ( ) ( ), , ln 1 MS M M n
M
QB w Q Q F w Q b w
L
! "
= + − +$ %
& '
.  (A6) 
Recalling that ( ) 1ln 1
n n
M nL F w w
α
α α
−
= =
− +
 (cf. (14)), utilizing ( ) 1
1
b w
w
α
α α
−
=
− +
, and 
rearranging, we write (A6) as 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1, , ln 1S M M M nB w Q Q F w Q b w Q b w
! "
# $= + − +
# $
& '
. (A7) 
We know that qw  is defined as a solution to ( ), , 0S MB w Q Q = , namely we have that 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
1ln 1q qM M nF w Q b w Q b w
! "
# $+ = +
# $
% &
. (A8) 
For 1qw = , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
ln1 1 1 1nM M M M n
b
F Q Q Q w b Q
b w
α α α+ = < − + − + = + , whereas for 
q Ew e= , ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 11
1 1
En
E
M M M ME E n
b ewF E Q Q Q b e Q
e e b w
α α α
α α α α
− − +
+ = + > + = +
− + − +
. From the 
continuity of ( )F ⋅  and ( )b ⋅  it follows that the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (A8) 
have to cross at least once, which ensures existence of a solution to (A8). Furthermore, 
because ( )ln 0F w
w
∂
>
∂
, and because ( ) 0b w! < , the left-hand side of (A8) and the right-hand 
side of (A8) cross exactly once, which guarantees uniqueness of the solution to (A8). Having 
that for q nw w=  (A8) becomes ( ) ( )ln n nF w b w= , which, as shown in the proof of 
Proposition 1, holds, then q nw w=  has to be the unique solution to (A2) when 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
= . 
(b) Because when 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
= , then q nw w= , as shown in part (a) of the proof, we can divide 
any pair ( ),S MQ Q  where 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
>  into a preliminary choice ( ),S MQ Q!  where 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
!
= , 
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and a residual choice ( ),0SQ!! , where S S SQ Q Q! !!+ = . For the preliminary choice ( ),S MQ Q! , 
there is no change in the equilibrium level of w in comparison with the no-migration setting 
(cf. part (a) of the proposition), namely ( ),q nS Mw Q Q w! = . For the residual choice ( ),0SQ!! , 
because 0
q
S
w
Q
∂
>
∂
 (cf. Claim 1), ( ) ( ), ,q qS S M S Mw Q Q Q w Q Q! !! !+ > . In combination, when 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
> , it follows that ( ) ( ), ,q q q nS S M S Mw w Q Q Q w Q Q w! !! != + > = . 
(c) To prove part (c) of the proposition, we follow a procedure similar to the one used to 
prove part (b). Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3. Under a uniform entry fee: (a) the composition of migration by skill type is 
such that migrants are all or mostly managers, 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
< ; (b) for each fee-induced level of 
migration, the corresponding composition of migration by skill type is fixed; (c) migrants are 
of higher productivity than under a quota. 
Proof. (a) We first show that ensuring migration only of scientists is impossible under a 
uniform entry fee. If under such a fee only scientists were to migrate, then in equilibrium we 
would have uef nS Sw w<  and 
uef n
M Mw w>  (the proof is analogous to the proof of part (b) of 
Proposition 2). In a setting without migration we have that n F n FM M S Sw w w w− > −  (cf. (17)), 
which, together with uef nS Sw w<  and 
uef n
M Mw w> , implies that 
uef F uef F
M M S Sw w w w− > − , or that 
under a uniform entry fee with only scientists migrating, the wage difference between the two 
countries will be higher for managers than for scientists. However, if uef F uef FM M S Sw w w w− > −  
were to obtain, then managers too will find it beneficial to migrate and, thus, we reach a 
contradiction.  
We next show that ensuring migration only of managers is possible under a uniform 
entry fee. By choosing the entry fee a little below the between-countries difference in the 
earnings of a manager with the highest skill level, ( )n FM Mx w w T< − , managers will find it 
beneficial to migrate, but scientists will not (cf. (20) in conjunction with (17)). Because the 
wages of managers decrease as more managers enter the receiving country, the inflow of 
migrant managers will cease as soon as those wages drop to a level at which it is no longer 
profitable for them to migrate, which obtains when ( )( ) ( )( )uef F mM M M M Mw Q x w Q x xθ" #− =% & , 
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where mMθ  stands for the skill level of a manager who is indifferent between paying the fee 
and not migrating. Because the wages of scientists increase as more managers enter the 
receiving country, a direct consequence of migration of only managers is convergence of the 
wages of the two skill types. As a result, migration will consist exclusively of managers when 
the entry fee is above a certain level, denoted by x , such that if the entry fee is lower than x , 
scientists find it beneficial to migrate alongside managers. Specifically, x  is determined by 
equalizing the returns from migration to the most skilled scientist (namely the first one to 
migrate) with the returns from migration to the manager who is indifferent so as to whether to 
pay the fee or not to migrate (namely the last one to migrate when migration is manned only 
by managers), that is, x  is such that 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )uef F uef F mS M S M M M M Mw Q x w T w Q x w Q x xθ− = − = . 
By setting the entry fee at a level below x , the receiving country will encourage 
migration of both scientists and managers. We next show that this migration cannot exceed 
the ratio 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
= . Imagine differently, namely that 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
≥ . If so, then the average skill 
level of the migrants, and the skill level of an individual who is indifferent as to whether to 
pay the fee or not to migrate, will be lower for scientists than for managers, that is, we will 
have m mS Mθ θ<  and 
m m
S Mθ θ< , respectively. Because migration occurs up to the point at which 
( ) ( )uef F m uef F mS S S M M Mw w x w wθ θ− = = − , then from m mS Mθ θ<  it follows that we will have 
uef F uef F
S S M Mw w w w− > − , or, on rearrangement and upon recalling that / 1
F F F n
M Sw w w w= = > , 
we will have uef uef n nM S M Sw w w w− < − , which requires 
uef n
M M
uef n
S S
w w
w w
< . However, 
uef n
M M
uef n
S S
w w
w w
<  can 
only obtain if migration is only or mostly of managers; therefore, we have a contradiction.  
(b) Imagine otherwise, namely that for a given overall level of migration corresponding to a 
given entry fee, there can be two compositions of migration by skill type: S MQ Q Q! !+ =  and 
S MQ Q Q!! !!+ = , where S SQ Q! !!> , which implies that M MQ Q! !!< . From S SQ Q! !!>  and M MQ Q! !!<  it 
follows that ( ) ( ), ,uef F uef FM S M M M S M Mw Q Q w w Q Q w! ! !! !!− > −  and that ( ),uef FS S M Sw Q Q w! ! −  
( ),uef FS S M Sw Q Q w!! !!< − , or that the returns from migration to managers (scientists) are higher 
(lower) under the migration of SQ!  scientists and MQ!  managers than the returns from 
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migration to managers under the migration of SQ!! scientists and MQ!!  managers; and that 
( ) ( ), ,m mM S M M S MQ Q Q Qθ θ" " "" "">  and ( ) ( ), ,m mS S M S S MQ Q Q Qθ θ" " "" ""< , or that the skill level of a 
manager (scientist) who is indifferent as to whether to pay the fee or not to migrate is higher 
(lower) under the migration of SQ!  scientists and MQ!  managers than under the migration of 
SQ!! scientists and MQ!!  managers.  
For there to be two combinations of the (same) overall level of migration corresponding 
to a given entry fee 1x , it has to be the case that in equilibrium 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1, , , ,uef F m uef F mM S M M M S M S S M S S S Mw Q Q w Q Q w Q Q w Q Q xθ θ" " " " " " " "− = − =  
and  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1, , , ,uef F m uef F mM S M M M S M S S M S S S Mw Q Q w Q Q w Q Q w Q Q xθ θ"" "" "" "" "" "" "" ""− = − = , 
or that the migration premium of a scientist and of a manager who are indifferent as to 
whether to pay the fee or not to migrate is equal to the entry fee. Suppose that, indeed, 
( )( ) ( ), ,uef F mM S M M M S Mw Q Q w Q Qθ" " " "− ( )( ) ( ), ,uef F mS S M S S S Mw Q Q w Q Qθ" " " "= − 1x=  holds. Because 
( ) ( ), ,uef F uef FM S M M M S M Mw Q Q w w Q Q w! ! !! !!− > −  and ( ),uef FS S M Sw Q Q w! ! − ( ),uef FS S M Sw Q Q w!! !!< − , and 
because ( ) ( ), ,m mM S M M S MQ Q Q Qθ θ" " "" "">  and ( ),mS S MQ Qθ " " ( ),mS S MQ Qθ "" ""< , it follows that 
( )( ) ( ) 1, ,uef F mM S M M M S Mw Q Q w Q Q xθ"" "" "" ""− <  and that ( )( ) ( ) 1, ,uef F mS S M S S S Mw Q Q w Q Q xθ"" "" "" ""− > , or that 
fewer than MQ!!  managers and more than SQ!! scientists will find it beneficial to migrate when 
required to pay the fee of 1x . Therefore, both S MQ Q Q! !+ =  and S MQ Q Q!! !!+ =  cannot obtain 
for the same level of the entry fee. 
(c) Whereas under a quota the migrants constitute a random selection from the workforce of 
the sending country, under a uniform entry fee the migrants’ skill level is higher than a certain 
threshold, as defined by (20). Q.E.D.  
Proposition 4. uef q nw w w< <  if migration is of the same level and composition by skill type 
under a quota as under a uniform entry fee. 
Proof. We first present a claim. 
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Claim 2. 0
uef
m
S S
w
Qθ
∂
>
∂
 and 0
uef
m
M M
w
Qθ
∂
<
∂
. 
Proof. By following an analogous procedure as that in the proof of Claim 1, on recalling that 
uefw  is the solution to  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , ln 1m m m m mS S M M M M S S M MB w Q Q F w Q b w Q Qθ θ θ θ θ= + − + + , (A9)  
we get that 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
0
ln 1 1
uef uefuef
m uef uef uef m m
S S S S M M
b w ww
Q f w b w b w Q Qθ θ θ
∂
= >
∂ + − + +
, 
and  
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1
0
ln 1 1
uef uefuef
m uef uef uef m m
M M S S M M
b w ww
Q f w b w b w Q Qθ θ θ
−∂
= − <
∂ + − + +
.  
Q.E.D. 
We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 4. The proof that uef nw w<  is analogous to the 
proof of part (c) of Proposition 2, with a reference to Claim 2 replacing the reference to Claim 
1. Because the right-hand side of the inequality, namely q nw w< , holds from part (c) of 
Proposition 2, we can focus on the left-hand side of the inequality, namely on uef qw w< . 
Under a uniform entry fee, migration that is relatively small in size has to consist only of 
managers, as shown in part (a) of Proposition 3. Because the equilibrium value of w is a 
decreasing function of MQ , and because 1
m
Mθ >  the inflow of effective units of managerial 
work under an entry fee is larger than the inflow of managers, namely mM M MQ Qθ > , then it 
has to be the case that uef qw w<  when under a uniform entry fee and under a quota all the 
migrants are managers.  
By reducing the entry fee below the level x , defined in the proof of part (a) of 
Proposition 3, scientists will migrate as well as managers. Any subsequent decrease of the 
entry fee aimed at inducing a larger inflow of migrants will attract relatively more scientists 
than managers because any decrease of the entry fee benefits relatively more the low-earning 
scientists than the high-earning managers. The relatively larger inflow of scientists than of 
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(additional) managers raises uefw . Under a quota, such a relatively larger inflow of scientists 
than of (additional) managers will also increase qw  (recalling that we compare uefw  with qw  
for migration of the same level and composition by skill type under the two policies). 
However, under a uniform entry fee, scientists will be of higher skill level than the 
(additional) managers. Therefore, the inflow of effective units of scientific work relative to 
the inflow of (additional) effective units of managerial work will be higher under a uniform 
entry fee than under a quota for the same level of migration and composition by skill type. 
Consequently, uefw  will increase with the level of migration (that is, with the lowering of the 
entry fee) at a higher rate than qw . Equalization of uefw  and qw  will occur only in the limit, 
that is, in a hypothetical setting where the entry fee is set at zero, in which case all foreigners, 
scientists and managers alike, will find it beneficial to migrate and, thus, all the migrants will 
have the same average skill level. Therefore, uef qw w<  continues to hold under a joint 
migration of scientists and managers as long as 0x > . Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5. Under a quota, the receiving country attains the optimal skill composition of 
its workforce (it maximizes SWF) when the level of migration is at the limit S MQ Q Q+ = , 
and when the composition of migration by skill type is such that the migrants are 
(a)  all scientists, namely 0MQ = , if ( ) ( ),0 0,q qSWF Q SWF Q> ;  
(b)  all managers, namely 0SQ = , if ( ) ( ),0 0,q qSWF Q SWF Q< . 
Proof. Under a quota, the SWF is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ln
0 0 0ln
,
q
q
w T E T
q q q
S M M S
w
SWF Q Q u g f d d u g f d dθ ε θ ε θ ε θ ε= +∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ . (A10) 
Upon substitution for qMu  and 
q
Su  from (1), and recalling that j jc wθ= , and upon noting that 
( ) ( )
0
ln
T
g d Kθ θ θ =∫  is a constant, (A10) becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ln
0 ln
, ln ln
q
q
w E
q q q
S M M S
w
SWF Q Q K w f d K w f dε ε ε ε ε= + + + +∫ ∫ . (A11) 
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Given that qSw  and 
q
Mw  do not depend on ε , and that ( ) ( )
ln
0
ln
qw
q q
Mf d F w Lε ε = =∫  and 
( ) ( )
ln
1 ln
q
E
q q
S
w
f d F w Lε ε = − =∫ , we can rewrite the objective function of the receiving 
country as  
 ( ) ( )
ln
, ln ln
q
E
q q q q q
S M M M S S
w
SWF Q Q K L w L w f dε ε ε= + + + ∫ . (A12) 
Because (A12) depends on the behavior of individuals and firms, and because the 
receiving country first chooses the quota of migrant scientists, SQ , and the quota of migrant 
managers, MQ , and thereafter, aware of the declared migration policy, individuals make their 
occupational choices, we can incorporate the responses of individuals and firms to migration 
into the receiving country’s optimization problem. These reactions are exhibited by the 
expressions qSw  and 
q
Mw  in (19), by ( )1 lnq qSL F w= − , and by ( )lnq qML F w= . Upon 
substitution for qSw , 
q
Mw , 
q
SL , and 
q
ML  into (A12), the SWF becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
ln
, ln ln 1
q
E
q q q
S M
w
SWF Q Q D w F w f dα η ε ε ε$ %= + − + + +' ( ∫ ,  (A13)  
where ( ) ( )( ) ln 1 ln 1D Kα η α α η α= + + − − − + .  
The receiving country chooses a quota SQ  of migrant scientists and a quota MQ  of 
migrant managers, namely a pair ( ),S MQ Q , with the aim of maximizing (A13) subject to the 
non-negativity constraints on the choice variables, 0SQ ≥  and 0MQ ≥ , and subject to the 
constraint on the level of migration, S MQ Q Q+ ≤ . Because these three constraints are linear, 
the feasible region is a triangle given by the intersection of 0SQ ≥ , 0MQ ≥ , and 
S MQ Q Q+ ≤ , with vertices at ( )0,0 , ( ),0Q , and ( )0,Q . The Lagrangian for the constrained 
optimization problem is  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
ln ,
, ln , ln , 1
,
q
S M
q q
S M S M S M
E
S M
w Q Q
V Q Q D w Q Q F w Q Q
f d Q Q Q
α η
ε ε ε λ
% &
' (
% &% & % &= + − + +' ( ' (' (
+ + − −∫
  (A14) 
40 
 
where, for the sake of transparency, we emphasize that qw  is a function of SQ  and MQ . The 
first-order conditions for the SWF maximization problem are 
 0, 0, and 0j j
j j
V VQ Q
Q Q
∂ ∂
≤ ≥ =
∂ ∂
, (A15) 
and 
 0, 0, and 0V Vλ λ
λ λ
∂ ∂
≥ ≥ =
∂ ∂
. (A16) 
That 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
ln
lnlnln 1 ln
ln ln lnln 1 ln ln ln ln
lnln 1 ,
q
q Eq
q q
j j j j w
q q q
q q q q q
j j j
q
q
j
F wV wF w w f d
Q Q Q Q
w w wF w w f w w f w
Q Q Q
wF w
Q
α η ε ε ε λ
α η λ
α η λ
∂∂ ∂ ∂& '= − + + + + −) *∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂& '= − + + + − −) * ∂ ∂ ∂
∂& '= − + + −) * ∂
∫
  
yields 
 ( ) lnln 1
q
q
S S
V wF w
Q Q
α η λ
∂ ∂% &= − + + −( )∂ ∂
 (A17) 
and 
 ( ) lnln 1
q
q
M M
V wF w
Q Q
α η λ
∂ ∂% &= − + + −( )∂ ∂
. (A18) 
Finally, 
 S M
V Q Q Q
λ
∂
= − −
∂
. (A19)  
We first show that the maximum of the SWF cannot obtain under a migration of both 
scientists and managers, that is, it cannot obtain for the intersection of 0SQ >  and 0MQ > . It 
follows from the first-order conditions (A15) that if a maximum to the SWF were to obtain 
for ( )* *,S MQ Q  such that * 0SQ >  and * 0MQ > , then it would be required that  
 
( ) ( )* * * *, ,
0S M S M
S M
V Q Q V Q Q
Q Q
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
. (A20) 
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Let ( ) ( )ln ln 1q qh w F w α η≡ − + + . On substitution from ( ) lnln
q
q
S S
V wh w
Q Q
λ
∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂
 and 
( ) lnln
q
q
M M
V wh w
Q Q
λ
∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂
 (cf. (A17) and (A18), respectively, upon incorporating the 
definition of ( )ln qh w ) in (A20), and on rearrangement, we get that (A20) obtains only if 
( )( )* *ln , 0q S Mh w Q Q! " =# $ , which in turn implies that 0λ =  (noting that 
ln 1 0
q q
q
S S
w w
Q w Q
∂ ∂
= >
∂ ∂
 
whereas ln 1 0
q q
q
M M
w w
Q w Q
∂ ∂
= <
∂ ∂
, (cf. Claim 1)). When 0λ = , any point for which (A20) holds 
is an ordinary stationary point which has to obey the second partial derivative test. The 
Hessian matrix for any stationary point is given by 
 ( )
2
2
ln ln ln
ln
ln ln ln
q q q
S S Mq
q q q
S M M
w w w
Q Q Q
H f w
w w w
Q Q Q
! "# $∂ ∂ ∂
& '( )
∂ ∂ ∂& '* +
= & '
# $∂ ∂ ∂& '
( )& '∂ ∂ ∂* +, -
.  
We have that 
2
ln 0
q
j
w
Q
! "∂
>$ %$ %∂& '
 and that det 0H =  and, thus, the second partial derivative test is 
inconclusive.20 However, because H has positive entries on the main diagonal, it cannot 
constitute a maximum of the SWF. Therefore, a maximum of the SWF can obtain only either 
when the migrants are all scientists, or when the migrants are all managers, or when there is 
no migration at all. We explore each of these possible cases in turn.  
If migration exclusively of scientists were to maximize the SWF, that is, if a maximum 
of the SWF were to obtain for ( )* ,0SQ , where * 0SQ > , then the first-order conditions given by 
                                               
20 That det 0H =  follows from the properties of the CRS Cobb-Douglas production function. When using such 
a production function for calculating the equilibrium levels of wages, the ratios of the two types of workers 
matter, not their numbers. For any initial ratio of scientists to managers, we can add several scientists and several 
managers in such a proportion that the ratio of scientists to managers remains unchanged. Such an addition will 
not affect the distribution of the individuals by skill types as well as by the wages paid to different skill types in 
equilibrium. Consequently, the equilibrium ratio of managerial work to scientific work will not change either 
and, similarly, the value of the SWF will not change either because it depends only on ( ),q S Mw Q Q . This is why 
the SWF does not strictly increase (or strictly decrease) locally in the neighborhood of any point of the feasible 
region, and why the second derivative test (and also higher-order derivative tests) is (are) inconclusive.  
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(A15) are 
( )* ,0
0S
S
V Q
Q
∂
=
∂
 and 
( )* ,0
0S
M
V Q
Q
∂
≤
∂
. We consider two cases: *SQ Q<  and 
*
SQ Q= . If 
*
SQ Q< , then it follows from the first-order condition (A16) that 0λ = . With 0λ = , and on 
recalling (A17) and (A18), we get that 
( )* ,0
0S
S
V Q
Q
∂
=
∂
 holds only if ( )( )*ln ,0 0q Sh w Q! " =# $  
which, in turn, and together with 0λ = , implies that 
( )* ,0
0S
M
V Q
Q
∂
=
∂
. Because a point 
0
S M
V V
Q Q
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
 cannot constitute a maximum of the SWF (as shown in the preceding part of 
this proof), any point ( )* ,0SQ  such that *0 SQ Q< <  does not maximize the SWF.  
If *SQ Q= , then 0λ ≥ . With 0λ ≥ , and recalling (A17) and (A18), we get that 
( ),0 0
S
V Q
Q
∂
=
∂
 and ( ),0 0
M
V Q
Q
∂
≤
∂
 jointly hold if ( )( ) ( )
ln ,0
ln ,0
q
q
S
w Q
h w Q
Q
λ
" #∂ % &" # =% & ∂
 and 
( )( ) ( )
ln ,0
ln ,0
q
q
M
w Q
h w Q
Q
λ
" #∂ % &" # ≤% & ∂
. Substituting for λ  from the preceding equation into the 
last inequality, we get that for a maximum to obtain at ( ),0Q , it is required that 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
ln ,0 ln ,0
ln ,0 ln ,0
q q
q q
M S
w Q w Q
h w Q h w Q
Q Q
! " ! "∂ ∂$ % $ %! " ! "≤$ % $ %∂ ∂
, which holds if 
( )( )ln ,0 0qh w Q! " ># $ . Because ( )( )ln ,0 0qh w Q! " ># $  can well be satisfied, ( ),0Q  can 
constitute a (local) maximum to the SWF. 
For the case of migration consisting exclusively of managers, the proof tracks the same 
steps as those taken for the case of migration consisting exclusively of scientists. In this case, 
( )0,Q  constitutes a (local) maximum of the SWF if ( )( )ln 0, 0qh w Q! " <# $ . 
For the no-migration state to constitute a maximum of the SWF, it is required that 
( )0,0 0
S
V
Q
∂
≤
∂
 and that ( )0,0 0
M
V
Q
∂
≤
∂
 (cf. (A15)) or, upon recalling (A17) and (A18), that 
( ) lnln
n
n
S
wh w
Q
λ
∂
≤
∂
 and that ( ) lnln
n
n
M
wh w
Q
λ
∂
≤
∂
. Because ( )0,0 0V
λ
∂
>
∂
, then from (A16) it 
follows that 0λ =  and, thus, a maximum of the SWF will be obtained for the no-migration 
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state if ( ) lnln 0
n
n
S
wh w
Q
∂
≤
∂
 and ( ) lnln 0
n
n
M
wh w
Q
∂
≤
∂
. However, because ln 0
n
S
w
Q
∂
>
∂
 whereas 
ln 0
n
M
w
Q
∂
<
∂
, both ( ) lnln 0
n
n
S
wh w
Q
∂
≤
∂
 and ( ) lnln 0
n
n
M
wh w
Q
∂
≤
∂
 cannot hold simultaneously 
and, thus, a maximum of the SWF cannot be obtained for the no-migration state. 
Thus far we have shown that the only points that might constitute a maximum of the 
SWF are ( ),0Q  (which locally maximizes SWF if ( )( )ln ,0 0qh w Q! " ># $ ) and ( )0,Q  (which 
locally maximizes SWF if ( )( )ln 0, 0qh w Q! " <# $ ). We next show that at least one of these two 
points actually locally maximizes SWF. Because 
( ) ( )
ln lnln 0
q q
q
S S
h w wf w
Q Q
∂ ∂
= >
∂ ∂
, and 
( ) ( )
ln lnln 0
q q
q
M M
h w wf w
Q Q
∂ ∂
= <
∂ ∂
, as we increase the level of migration consisting exclusively 
of scientists (managers) from zero to a positive value, ( )ln qh w  increases (decreases). If in the 
no-migration setting we have that ( )ln 0nh w ≥ , then it has to be that ( )( )ln ,0 0qh w Q! " ># $ , in 
which case ( ),0Q  locally maximizes SWF. If, however, ( )ln 0nh w ≤ , then it has to be that 
( )( )ln 0, 0qh w Q! " <# $ , in which case ( )0,Q  locally maximizes SWF. Because either 
( )ln 0nh w ≥  or ( )ln 0nh w ≤ , then at least one of the two points will locally maximize SWF. 
If only one of the two points ( ),0Q  and ( )0,Q  locally maximizes SWF, then that point 
maximizes SWF globally. If, however, both ( ),0Q  and ( )0,Q  locally maximize SWF, which 
occurs if ( )( )ln ,0 0qh w Q! " ># $  and ( )( )ln 0, 0qh w Q! " <# $ , then ( ),0Q  globally maximizes 
SWF if ( ) ( ),0 0,q qSWF Q SWF Q> . The inverse of the latter inequality yields ( )0,Q  as a 
global maximum of the SWF. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1. 1Q  exists, and is unique. 
Proof. 1Q  is defined as 
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η α
η α
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%%
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= = −%'
  
To show that 1Q  exists and that it is unique, we address in turn the cases 
n
SLη α< − , 
n
SLη α> − , and 
n
SLη α= − . We first present a claim. 
Claim 3. Under a quota, when migrants are of the same skill type, as we increase the level of 
migration from zero to a positive value, the value of the SWF 
(a)  first decreases and then increases when migrants are all scientists, and 
continuously increases when migrants are all managers, if the externality 
generated by the scientists is sufficiently weak, that is, if 
( )1 lnn nSL F wη α α< − = − − ; 
(b)  continuously increases when migrants are all scientists, and first decreases and 
then increases when migrants are all managers, if the externality generated by the 
scientists is sufficiently strong, that is, if nSLη α> − ; 
(c)  continuously increases when migrants are all scientists and when migrants are all 
managers, if the externality generated by the scientists is neither strong nor weak, 
that is, if nSLη α= − . 
Proof. The change in the value of the SWF brought about by a marginal increase in the level 
of migration of a given type is measured by ( ) ( ), lnln
q q
S M q
j j
SWF Q Q wh w
Q Q
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
, ,j S M=  
(recalling that ( ) ( )ln ln 1q qh w F w α η≡ − + + ). Because ln 1 0
q q
q
S S
w w
Q w Q
∂ ∂
= >
∂ ∂
 and 
ln 1 0
q q
q
M M
w w
Q w Q
∂ ∂
= <
∂ ∂
 (cf. Claim 1), the sign of ( ),
q
S M
j
SWF Q Q
Q
∂
∂
 at each point of the feasible 
region depends on the sign of ( )ln qh w . Upon opening up to migration, and because 
( )ln 0,0 lnq nw w! " =# $ , the direction of the change in the value of the SWF brought about by a 
marginal increase in the level of migration of a given type from zero to a small positive value 
depends on whether ( )ln 0nh w < , ( )ln 0nh w > , or ( )ln 0nh w = , or, upon recalling that 
45 
 
( ) ( )ln ln 1n n nSh w F w Lα η η α= − + + = + − , it depends on whether nSLη α< − , nSLη α> − , or 
n
SLη α= − , respectively. These three possibilities correspond to parts (a), (b), and (c) of this 
claim; we attend to the three parts in turn. 
(a) When nSLη α< − , then 
( )0,0 0
q
S
SWF
Q
∂
<
∂
 and ( )0,0 0
q
M
SWF
Q
∂
>
∂
, which indicate that an 
increase in the level of migration consisting exclusively of scientists (managers) from zero to 
a small positive value will decrease (increase) the value of the SWF. Because 
ln 1 0
q q
q
M M
w w
Q w Q
∂ ∂
= <
∂ ∂
 and 
( ) ( )
ln lnln 0
q q
q
M M
h w wf w
Q Q
∂ ∂
= <
∂ ∂
, it follows that 
( )0, 0
q
M
M
SWF Q
Q
∂
>
∂
 for all MQ . Consequently, the value of the SWF continuously increases 
with the level of migration consisting exclusively of managers, thus 
( ) ( )0, 0,0q q nMSWF Q SWF SWF> =  for all 0MQ > , given that nSLη α< − . When the level 
of migration consisting exclusively of scientists is small, ( ) ( )ln ln 0q nh w h w≈ <  and, thus, 
( ),0 0
q
S
S
SWF Q
Q
∂
<
∂
, whereas when it is large enough, it follows from ln 1 0
q q
q
S S
w w
Q w Q
∂ ∂
= >
∂ ∂
, 
( ) ( )
ln lnln 0
q q
q
S S
h w wf w
Q Q
∂ ∂
= >
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, and ( )ln 0Eh e α η= + > , that ( )ln 0qh w >  and, thus, 
( ),0 0
q
S
S
SWF Q
Q
∂
>
∂
. Consequently, holding 0MQ = , the value of the SWF first decreases and 
then increases with the level of migration consisting exclusively of scientists.  
(b) The proof of (b) tracks the same steps as those taken in the proof of (a).  
(c) When nSLη α= − , then 
( )0,0 0
q
S
SWF
Q
∂
=
∂
 and ( )0,0 0
q
M
SWF
Q
∂
=
∂
. Because ln 0
q
S
w
Q
∂
>
∂
 and 
ln 0
q
M
w
Q
∂
<
∂
, and because 
( ) ( )
ln lnln 0
q q
q
S S
h w wf w
Q Q
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= >
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 and 
( ) ( )
ln lnln 0
q q
q
M M
h w wf w
Q Q
∂ ∂
= <
∂ ∂
, it follows that ( ),0 0
q
S
S
SWF Q
Q
∂
>
∂
 and ( )0, 0
q
M
M
SWF Q
Q
∂
>
∂
 
for any positive value of SQ  and MQ . Consequently, the SWF continuously increases with the 
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level of migration consisting exclusively of scientists or exclusively of managers, thus 
( ) ( ),0 0,0q q nSSWF Q SWF SWF> =  and ( ) ( )0, 0,0q q nMSWF Q SWF SWF> =  for all 
, 0S MQ Q > . Q.E.D. 
We now return to the proof of Lemma 1. From Claim 3 we know that when nSLη α< − , 
then upon increasing the level of migration that consists exclusively of scientists from zero to 
a positive value, the value of the SWF first decreases and then increases. The remaining 
question is whether the eventual increase is large enough to compensate for the initial 
decrease, that is, whether for large enough migration consisting exclusively of scientists the 
value of the SWF will be higher than the corresponding value in the no-migration setting. 
Because the wages of scientists and managers are given by ( )1/S M Sw L L
α η
α
− −
=  and 
( )( )1 /M S Mw L L
α η
α
+
= − , respectively, as we increase SQ  but not MQ , and thereby increase 
SL  relative to ML  (cf. part (b) of Proposition 2), the wages of scientists go down and the 
wages of managers go up, eventually leading to all the natives choosing management over 
science, which occurs when ln lnq qM Sw w E> + . As SQ  increases further, the wages of 
managers eventually become high enough for the individual with the highest occupational 
prestige preferring management under a quota to science under no migration, namely 
ln lnq nM Sw w E> + . At that point, all the natives are better off than in the no-migration setting, 
thus clearly ( ),0q nSSWF Q SWF> . Altogether, when nSLη α< − , ( )0,q nMSWF Q SWF>  for 
all MQ , whereas ( ),0q nSSWF Q SWF<  for small SQ , and ( ),0q nSSWF Q SWF>  for large 
SQ . Because the sign of 
( ),0q S
S
SWF Q
Q
∂
∂
 changes only once, there can be only one magnitude 
of migration such that ( ),0q nSSWF Q SWF= .  
For the case when nSLη α> − , the proof follows steps that are akin to the ones taken in 
the case nSLη α< − . For 
n
SLη α= − , a proof is not needed. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2. (a) 2Q  exists, and is unique. (b) 2 1Q Q< , if 
n
SLη α> − ; 2 1Q Q= , if 
n
SLη α≤ − . 
Proof. (a) The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1. 
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(b) That 2 1Q Q<  if 
n
SLη α> −  follows because under a uniform entry fee, when all the 
migrants are managers, the SWF attains the same values as under a quota when migration is at 
a lower level than under a quota. This is so because migration of a given level is of more 
effective units of work under a uniform entry fee than under a quota, which is due to the 
positive self-selection by the migrants (cf. part (c) of Proposition 3). Thus, fewer managers 
are needed under a uniform entry fee than under a quota for the SWF to be of equal value to 
that in the no-migration setting. That 2 1Q Q=  if 
n
SLη α< −  follows from a comparison of (24) 
and (25). Q.E.D. 
Proposition 7. Under a uniform entry fee, when 2Q Q≤ , the receiving country attains the 
optimal skill composition of its workforce (it maximizes SWF) when  
(a)  the level of migration is zero, 0S MQ Q= = , if the externality generated by the 
scientists is sufficiently strong, that is, if nSLη α> − ; 
(b)  the level of migration is at ( ){ }min ,Q x Q , if the externality generated by the 
scientists is sufficiently weak, that is, if nSLη α< − . 
Proof. We first present the following claim. 
Claim 4. Under a uniform entry fee, as we increase the level of migration from zero to a 
positive value, the value of the SWF 
(a)  continuously increases, until scientists too find it beneficial to migrate, if the 
externality generated by the scientists is sufficiently weak, that is, if nSLη α≤ − ; 
(b)  first decreases and then increases when migrants are all managers, if the 
externality generated by the scientists is sufficiently strong, that is, if nSLη α> − ; 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Claim 3.  
We now return to the proof of Proposition 7. The proof follows from the intersection of Claim 
4 and (25) for part (a), and when ( ){ }min ,Q x Q Q=  for part (b). When 
( ){ } ( )min ,Q x Q Q x= , then by setting the fee at x x< , the receiving country will encourage  
migration of both scientists and managers. Because the incoming scientists are of higher 
average skill level than the incoming managers, m mS Mθ θ> , then by increasing the level of 
migration, the receiving country will admit relatively more units of effective scientific work 
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than of effective (additional) managerial work, which reduces the desired “crowding out 
effect” (cf. the proof of Proposition 4). Therefore, it is not optimal for the receiving country to 
have an overall migration larger than ( )Q x . Q.E.D. 
Proposition 11. Under a differentiated entry fee, when 3Q Q≤ , the receiving country attains 
the optimal skill composition of its workforce (it maximizes SWF) when the level of 
migration is at the limit S MQ Q Q+ = , and when the composition of migration by skill type is 
such that the migrants are  
(a)  all scientists, namely 0MQ = , if the externality generated by the scientists is 
sufficiently strong, that is, if nSLη α> − ; 
(b)  all managers, namely 0SQ = , if the externality generated by the scientists is 
sufficiently weak, that is, if nSLη α< − . 
Proof. We first present two claims. 
Claim 5. Under a differentiated entry fee, the welfare of the natives is maximized when the 
level of migration is at the limit S MQ Q Q+ = , and when the composition of migration by 
skill type is such that the migrants are 
(a)  all scientists, namely 0MQ = , if ( ) ( ),0 0,def defSWF Q SWF Q> ;  
(b)  all managers, namely 0SQ = , if ( ) ( ),0 0,def defSWF Q SWF Q< . 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.  
Claim 6. Under a differentiated entry fee, when migrants are of the same skill type, as we 
increase the level of migration from zero to a positive value, the value of the SWF 
(a)  first decreases and then increases when migrants are all scientists, and 
continuously increases when migrants are all managers, if the externality 
generated by the scientists is sufficiently weak, that is, if nSLη α< − ; 
(b)  continuously increases when migrants are all scientists, and first decreases and 
then increases when migrants are all managers, if the externality generated by the 
scientists is sufficiently strong, that is, if nSLη α> − ; 
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(c)  continuously increases when migrants are all scientists and when migrants are all 
managers, if the externality generated by the scientists is neither strong nor weak, 
that is, if nSLη α= − . 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Claim 3.  
We now return to the proof of Proposition 11. The proof follows from the intersection of 
Claim 5, Claim 6, and (27). Q.E.D. 
Proposition 13. The highest revenue is attained when migrants are only or mostly managers, 
namely when 
n
S S
n
M M
Q L
Q L
< .  
Proof. We prove the proposition by contradiction, showing that migration only or mostly of 
scientists cannot yield the highest possible revenue. This follows from the combination of two 
observations. First, by marginally increasing the level of migration from zero to a positive 
value, the revenue will be highest when the migrants are only managers because their wages, 
and consequently the entry fee that can be charged to them, are higher than the wages of 
scientists (cf. (17)). Second, for migration only or mostly of scientists, the wages of scientists 
(per unit of productivity) decrease, whereas the wages of managers increase as compared to 
the no-migration setting, because def nw w>  (the proof is analogous to the proof of 
Proposition 2 with a reference to Claim 2 replacing the reference to Claim 1), thereby further 
increasing the wage gap between the two skill types and, thus, the entry fee that can be 
charged to them. We conclude that when migrants are only or mostly scientists, the entry fee 
revenue will always be higher if several migrant scientists are replaced by migrant managers, 
and that the solution to the revenue-maximization problem has to be migration only or mostly 
of managers. Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix B: An illustrative calculation of the strength of the externality generated by 
the scientists, based on US data 
We seek to find out whether nSLη α> −  for the US. To calculate α , we use the equation for 
Sw  as displayed in (9), which, upon rearrangement and upon recalling that 
( )
1
M
S S
L YA l
L L
α−
# $
=% &
' (
, yields S Sw L
Y
α = . Calculating α  requires US data on the wages paid to 
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the scientists, their number, and the country’s GDP. For the purpose of this calculation we 
consider scientists to be STEM workers.21 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
database, in May 2015 there were 8.47 million STEM workers in the US, with a mean annual 
wage of $88,881. These data, together with the US GDP, which in the second quarter of 2015 
was estimated at $17,998.3 billion, yield 0.042α = .22 
Data on the share of scientists in the US workforce in the no-migration setting, nSL , are 
not available. However, nSLη α> −  will hold if instead of the no-migration share of scientists 
in the US workforce we use that share under a quota, qSL , provided that 
q n
S SL L> . In turn, 
q n
S SL L>  will hold if foreigners among scientists constitute a larger share than foreigners in the 
US workforce, that is, if S
S
Q Q
L
> . In 2010, the share of foreigners among STEM workers in 
the US was about 21.8 percent, whereas the share of foreigners in the US workforce was only 
17.6 percent (Table 1), which allows us to substitute nSL  with 
q
SL .
23 Because the share of 
STEM workers in the US is estimated at 0.061qSL =  (our calculations based on the BLS data), 
the US should seek to increase the share of scientists amongst migrants if 0.019η > . 
Unfortunately, we cannot estimate η  directly by applying the official US data to any of 
our model’s equations; for that we need to refer to the received literature. Moreover, whereas 
empirical studies that measure the social returns of higher education exist, the studies that 
measure externalities generated by specific skill types, science in particular, are scarce and, to 
the best of our knowledge, none measures the impact of STEM workers on TFP. Therefore, 
we calculate the value of η  indirectly drawing on the available empirical studies. The results 
of two studies (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; and Peri et al., 2015) can be used for such indirect 
calculation. The methods of obtaining η  in these studies are similar but differ somewhat. Kerr 
and Lincoln find no effect of migration of scientists and engineers on the wages of native 
                                               
21 We take the list of STEM occupations from the US BLS, which can be found at 
www.bls.gov/oes/stem_list.xlsx. 
22 A rather small estimated value for the output elasticity of scientific work, α , does not imply that the estimate 
for the output elasticity of managerial work is close to one, as would follow from the latter elasticity being 
defined as 1 α− ; when calculated directly, the estimate for output elasticity of managerial work is also small. 
The two elasticities add up to one only for a simple economy with two skill types as factors of production.  
23 Peri et al. (2015), who use a different definition of STEM workers than the one used by the US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, estimate the share of foreign-born among STEM workers in the US at 26 percent. 
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scientists and engineers in the US. This finding can formally be expressed as ln 0
ln
S
S
w
Q
∂
=
∂
. 
Because in our model (cf. (9) in conjunction with log-differentiation) ln 1
ln
S
S
w
Q
α η
∂
= + −
∂
, then 
ln 0
ln
S
S
w
Q
∂
=
∂
 implies that 1 0.958η α= − = . Peri et al. estimate that a one percent increase in 
the supply of STEM workers will increase the wages of college-educated workers by 4 to 6 
percent, and will have no effect on the wages of workers who are not college-educated. This 
finding can formally be expressed as ln4 6
ln
EDU
S
w
L
∂
< <
∂
 and ln 0
ln
NEDU
S
w
L
∂
=
∂
, where the 
subscript EDU stands for college-educated workers, and the subscript NEDU stands for not 
college-educated workers. The weighted average of these effects, where as weights we use the 
shares of college-educated workers and not college-educated workers in the US workforce, 
which are 0.39 and 0.61, respectively, is not larger than 1.56.24 In a model analogous to ours 
but with more than two skill types as inputs in the economy’s production function, the 
percentage change in the wage of each skill type other than science in response to a one 
percent increase in the size of the scientific workforce will be the same for each skill type and 
it will be equal to α η+  (just as in our model, cf. (9) in conjunction with log-differentiation, 
we have that ln / lnM Sw L α η∂ ∂ += ). Because STEM workers constitute a small fraction of 
the US workforce, we use α η+  as an approximation of the effect of a one percent increase in 
the size of the STEM workforce on the wages of all, STEM and non-STEM, workers in the 
US, that is, 1.56 α η≈ + . Therefore, upon recalling that 0.042α = , and upon rearrangement, 
we get that η  is not smaller than 1.518. Both values of η  that we calculated on the basis of 
received empirical literature are significantly higher than 0.019qSL α− = , which suggests that 
in the US, the externality generated by STEM workers is strong. 
These rudimentary calculations provide a rough measure of the interaction between the 
model’s parameters that determine the optimal composition of migration by skill type. Still, a 
large gap between the calculated “TFP effect,” η , and the calculated “crowding out effect,” 
n
SL α− , implies that there is considerable room for the actual values of the relevant 
parameters to differ from the estimates that we have presented. Overall, the numerical 
                                               
24 The shares were calculated using the US BLS data, which can be found at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat07.htm.  
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illustration points to a scientists-only migration as optimal for the receiving country when 
such a country can be characterized by parameters akin to the ones for the US. 
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